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1 Introduction
Cultural norms are increasingly gaining the attention of economists (Bowles, 1998; Akerlof
and Kranton, 2000; Guiso et al., 2006). While traditionally, due to its vague nature, culture is
understood by economists as an interesting but complicated matter, the undeniable effects it
has on most outcomes of organized economic activity has reinvigorated attempts to incorporate
it in economic frameworks (Bisin and Verdier, 2001; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005). Whether
it is understood as an autonomous system of ideas, in the Weberian sense of protestant work
ethic that shaped modern capitalism (Weber, 1930; Becker and Woessmann, 2009), or as an
optimal response to environmental factors that are then systematized by each society (Piketty,
1995; Benabou and Tirole, 2005), economists agree that there is an important effect of culture
(Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011; Nunn, 2012).
Ideas such as equality are certainly not foreign to economists, and are central in policy de-
bates regarding taxation and redistribution, as well as its effects on long term growth. Nonethe-
less, equality is related to moral rather than normative principles, thus different societies have
given different weight and definitions to it. Nowdays, equality is becoming increasingly as-
sociated with gender equality, and the perspectives towards women in general. Specifically,
attitudes towards the role of women in activities such as participating in the workforce, in pol-
itics or attending higher education, characterize the dominant culture of a society. While there
are many aspects of social life that may define perceptions on such beliefs, in this paper I will
concentrate on understanding the effect that historical economic parameters have on shaping
these cultural norms.
My focus will be centered on inequality in land ownership and how it may have affected
beliefs towards gender equality. Historically, land was one of the main means of earning a
livelihood, at least until industrialization. Post-industrialization naturally has lessened the
importance of land agriculture, however the effect of land ownership inequality - in earlier
stages of development - may have shaped attitudes towards the role and position of women in
different societies, due to its effect on economic autonomy of women. In this paper I will try to
determine whether earlier land inequality played a role in shaping such cultural attitudes, and
if traces of this historical economic factor can be found on contemporary beliefs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 goes through literature related to
culture and development, then focuses on gender equality beliefs and land inequality. Section 3
elaborates on the relevant literature and provides the theoretical argument. Section 4 presents
and describes the main data used. Section 5 includes the macroeconomic cross-country anal-
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ysis, with the empirical strategy and findings. Section 6 extends the baseline analysis to the
individual level, and checks whether the effect of historical land inequality can be found in
second generation immigrants. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Development and persistence of Culture
The historical determinants of culture, its persistence, and effects on development are in-
creasingly being studied by economists (Nunn, 2012). While usually culture as a concept is
still debated among economists, there is a growing consensus pointing to the direction of an
evolutionary process, as those “decision making heuristics, which typically manifest themselves
as values, beliefs and social norms” [page 1 (Nunn, 2012)]. Following literature from anthro-
pologists, culture is defined essentially as those “rules of thumb” that evolved over time to
help individuals make decisions in uncertain environment, if acquiring information is costly or
imperfect (Richerson and Boyd, 1985, 2005). The benefits of employing such “fast-and-frugal”
heuristics often outweigh costs of imprecision in many environments (Gigerenzer and Goldstein,
1996).
Historical events, and more generally history, played a role shaping cultural traits and long
term development. For instance, Transatlantic and Indian Ocean slave trade routes had a long-
term impact on distrust levels amongst individuals in Africa (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011).
Individuals whose ancestors belonged to ethnic groups residing closer to those routes, which
were heavily raided by slave traders, are less trusting today, even though these events took
place more than 400 years ago. In a European historical context, Italian city states that became
independent during the 12th century, developed a higher level of social capital and trust that can
be traced even today (Guiso et al., 2016). These cities had a form of participatory democracy,
which generated a feeling of belonging to the polity, guaranteeing property rights as well as
public goods provision, ending up creating a deep sense of civic and cooperative behaviour
(Putnam et al., 1993). Similarly, comparisons of medieval European populations, such as the
Genoese and Maghribis, reveal that their collectivist or individualist culture was shaped by
different strategies undertaken (by their ancestors) to prevent opportunistic behavior (Greif,
1993). Depending on whether a punishment was enforced collectively or not among merchants
engaged with long-distance trade, the respectable cultural trajectories of each society differed,
creating different cultural traits that persisted over the long run (Greif, 1994).
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Historical migrations within different parts of the U.S. provide further evidence regarding
the persistence of culture. The “culture of honour” that still exists in parts of Southern U.S.,
where one’s honour and reputation is highly valued and defended even by violent means, can be
explained by different histories of settlements between the North and South U.S. (Nisbett and
Cohen, 1996). While the North was settled primarily by groups with a farming background,
where protection of property rights was a primary concern, the South was mainly settled by
Celts, which historically organized in herding cultures, thus characterized by low population
densities and weaker protection of property. Hence, a culture of aggressiveness prevailed and
persists even today, as relevant studies have shown (Cohen et al., 1996). Furthermore, while
the identity of the settlement group may have been important, the prevalence or not of cultural
traits depended on the interaction between culture and institutions. For example, counties
in the U.S. South with more Scottish and Irish immigration prior to the 1800s, have higher
homicide rates today compared to similar neighbouring counties (Grosjean, 2014). Nevertheless,
this relation only exists in the South, highlighting the presence of weaker enforcement of the
rule of law and in general weaker formal institutions. In the North, stronger formal institutions
made this culture of honour detrimental, therefore this trait did not persist.
The interaction between the organizational forms of every society (i.e. institutions) and its
prevalent culture have shaped different societies accordingly. The most well-known example is
the colonial origins hypothesis examining the prevalence of European settlements in different
regions around the world during the Age of Exploration (15th to 18th century). The mortality
rates of early settlers affected the type of institutions that were implemented in different regions,
setting up inclusive institutions that provided rule of law and protection of property rights where
mortality rates were low, and extractive institutions otherwise (Acemoglu et al., 2001). These
European settlers did not just established such growth-promoting institutions though, they also
brought “themselves, their know-how and human capital”, or in other words their cultural traits
(Glaeser et al., 2004). Similar examples can be found by comparing early migration waves of
different religious groups to North America, such as the Puritans, the Cavaliers or the Quakers
(Fischer, 1989). For instance, the Cavaliers believed that inequality was a natural outcome that
should be maintained in society, thus focused on existing hierarchies. Hence, they emphasized
institutions providing limited education, lower taxes and an informal judicial system based on
such hierarchical structures.
The role of historical events and organizational forms of every society on cultural traits is
therefore significant. Nonetheless, in order to better understand the persistence of historical
factors on cultural traits across societies, comparisons between societies have to go beyond
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analysing specific historic instances and their effect on cultural traits, and focus on the relation
of historical phases with cultural traits. In general, cross-country comparisons of cultural char-
acteristics originated from cross-cultural psychology, and specifically from studies of Hofstede
in the 1980s, with thousands of interviews that took place across IBM employees in thirty
countries (Hofstede, 2001). The individual responses on a range of questions, were used to
create different dimensions of culture across countries (Heine, 2008), and have been used by
economists interested in culture and its effects. For instance, the dichotomy between individu-
alism and collectivism has been used to explain long-term growth (Gorodnichenko and Roland,
2017). However, this literature focuses on comparisons without analysing the role of history
determining cultural traits. Since this could be a complicated matter, I will only focus on
a specific cultural trait (gender equality), and analyse the role of historical economic factors
related to it.
Attitudes regarding gender equality have been used in order to understand the reasons
behind the cultural differences across societies. Measuring gender equality can be a multidi-
mensional phenomenon (Baxter, 1997), and feminist philosophy has deep divisions amongst
socialist, liberal and cultural strands of thought (Maynard, 1995). Specific attitudes regarding
the importance of equal participation in activities relating to the public sphere (right to work,
education, vote) are usually the focus of such measurements (Fischer et al., 2000). Coming from
an extensive social psychology literature, reliable multidimensional scales measuring attitudes
towards the division of sex roles both in home and workplace have been created already from
the 1970s and 1980s (Downing and Roush, 1985; Gerstmann and Kramer, 1997; Frieze and
McHugh, 1998). However, these scales were quite comprehensive, and therefore usually only
tested on smaller samples of college students, primarily in the United States (Bargad and Hyde,
1991; Liss et al., 2001). In order to make cross-national comparisons of such attitudes more ap-
propriate, measurements from various sources started to be used by political scientists, like the
Eurobarometer and the International Social Survey Programme (Wilcox, 1991; Banaszak and
Plutzer, 1993). The creation of the World Values Survey (WVS) in the 1980s (and European
Values Survey in the 1990s), provided an important tool for those interested in social attitudes
across different countries and has been used extensively among social scientists during the last
twenty years (e.g. Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Benabou and Tirole, 2005; Guiso et al., 2006).
While the WVS takes place every few years, and has an evolving design, the core battery of
questions regarding attitudes towards gender equality is usually present. By combining some
of the most focused questions regarding attitudes towards female labor participation, female
political representativeness and female education importance, gender equality scales were cre-
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ated and have been used to analyze determinants of culture across and within countries due to
industrialization and post-industrialization (Inglehart and Norris, 2003).
2.2 Agriculture and Beliefs
In societies transitioning from agricultural to industrialized, a notable shift occurred in
cultural norms and values related to gender equality, and has been even more pronounced in
post-industrial societies (Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2011). A major factor explaining this shift
has been the impact of economic growth on the type of labour – and human capital – typically
found in those societies. For instance, in agricultural societies there is a lower demand for high-
skilled workers, therefore a lower need for human capital development (i.e. through education)
which has been documented extensively in the economics literature (e.g. Galor et al., 2009). In
such societies, one of the main responsibilities allocated to women is childbearing, ensuring that
a higher number of healthy children will assist – either as adults or as children – in agricultural
production. Accordingly, food production and preparation is allocated to women, and jobs are
usually predominately male (Nanda, 2000).
By contrast, in industrial societies, there are increasing opportunities for women to join the
labour force, and supplement the family income (Geddes and Lueck, 2002), even though this
effect is stronger for later phases of industrialization rather than the early stages, due to the
nature of early industrial jobs (Goldin, 1988). Similarly, the earlier phases of industrialization
required lower levels of human capital, compared to the later phases in which specialization be-
came more prevalent, allowing for the creation of different types of occupations. Post-industrial
societies expand these opportunities even further, due to the increasing “availability of general
skills jobs not characterized by increasing returns to specific human capital, and that there-
fore do not penalize women for career interruption on account of child bearing and rearing”
[page 36 (Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2011)]. In these societies, gender roles have converged in fe-
male labour participation, educational opportunities and characteristics of the family structure
in general (Pasternak et al., 1997; Bonvillain, 1998), leading to a transformation from “male
breadwinner” to “dual earning” families (Blossfeld and Drobnic, 2003).
The impact of different types of labour on beliefs regarding the role of women in society,
is not an exclusively recent concern. One of the seminal works from Boserup (1970), argued
that the type of technology that could be used in different types of agricultural land, ultimately
laid the foundations for the role of women in each society. The main difference she pointed
out was the type of agriculture practiced across societies, specifically whether they used plough
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or shifting agriculture. Shifting agriculture is labor-intensive and requires women to actively
participate in farm work. Plough agriculture is more capital-intensive and requires upper body
strength (along with grip strength and burst of power), needed to pull the plough or control
the animals pulling it. Furthermore, plough agricultures’ difficulty to practice simultaneous
childcare led to women exclusively assuming that responsibility. These differences in type of
agriculture generated different norms about the natural role of women in society (Giuliano,
2015), which are observed across countries with similar institutions or economic development
(Giuliano, 2017) and include beliefs towards labor market participation, entrepreneurship, pol-
itics, education, polygamy, and marital payments (Aberle, 1961; Goody, 1976), and actual
female labor force participation (Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn, 2013).
Changes in the agricultural production can affect gender differences in the short-term as
well. Agricultural policy reforms in China during the late 1970s affected gender differences,
through their impact on labour productivity (Qian, 2008). In the Maoist era, central planning
focused on achieving production targets. However, a series of reforms during the early reform era
(1978-1980), increased the returns on various cash crops, including tea and orchards. Women
and men had a comparative advantage on different types of those crops. Men – due to height
and strength – could pick fruit easier from trees, while women had a comparative advantage
in picking tea leaves, a more delicate procedure. Comparing regions affected by these reforms,
tea-growing regions showed an increase in average female earnings, which was translated in
higher weight in household decision making, measured by fewer sex-selective abortions, less
infanticide of girls, and better educational outcomes for girls.
Studies on the impact of variations of agricultural production, and their compatibility with
specific crops, have showcased that there are important parameters connecting gender beliefs
with land agriculture and land ownership. Differences in characteristics of the soil (e.g. slope
and depth) or the amount of land required for cultivation, affected agricultural productivity
and the distribution of land ownership (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1994). For instance, depending
on the type of crop that could be cultivated, there is evidence that plough agriculture had an
impact on the formation on beliefs about gender equality, even after accounting for geographic
and environmental characteristics (e.g. terrain slope, soil depth, average temperature and
precipitation) (Pryor, 1985). Empirically, this effect was documented after separating plough
positive (i.e. cultivation benefits greatly from the plough) and plough negative (cultivation
benefits less from the plough), and analyzing the impact of different agricultural methods
(Pryor, 1985). Nonetheless, variations on the type of agricultural methods and specific crops
that could be grown in different regions have been linked to differences in land inequality and
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subsequent different levels of economic growth, institutional outcomes, and in general different
organizational forms of each society (Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000). Specifically, cash crops
(e.g. sugar, tobacco, coffee, rubber and bananas) were subject to economies of scale, while
the production of food crops (wheat, maize), at least in the pre-modern period, was subject
to constant returns of scale. The latter crop types were generally best suited for temperate
climates, while the former for tropical areas (Easterly, 2007; Frankema, 2010). These differences
had an impact on the type of crop selected by farmers, while at the same time had an impact
on the average farm size and more generally land inequality (Cinnirella and Hornung, 2016).
In regions characterized by economies of scale, land ownership concentration was higher, while
regions where agriculture was only subject to constant returns of scale had lower levels of land
inequality (Easterly, 2007). For instance, societies with a legacy of wheat agriculture (a crop
from the latter category) tend to have weaker family ties, hence a more egalitarian distribution
of household work (Ang and Fredriksson, 2017). Accordingly, societies characherized by weaker
family ties, have higher levels of female labour participation (Alesina and Giuliano, 2010).
Overall, the type of agricultural production had a significant effect on the distribution of land
holdings, female labour force pariticipation, as well as gender beliefs, leaving open the possibility
that these different effects can be connected.
3 Theoretical Mechanism
The previous section described the determinants of culture and their interplay with organi-
zational forms of society (i.e. institutions). It focused on how beliefs towards gender equality
have been linked to variations in the type of society (agricultural, industrial, post-industrial),
primarily due to their disparate effect on labour productivity of women, and therefore their
economic autonomy. Moreover, it analysed how agriculture affects beliefs towards gender equal-
ity, and how variations in agricultural production are linked to land ownership inequality and
female labour force participation. I argue that these separate effects can be connected, and
proceed to analyse the effect of land inequality on contemporary beliefs towards gender equality.
The main argument can be summarized as follows. Societies characterized by higher levels
of earlier land inequality, were less likely to move early towards industrialization, due to higher
returns on land productivity, thus making a late transition towards an industrialized economy.
Land inequality is usually higher in agricultural societies1 and, apart from historical instances
1For instance, the correlation between land inequality around 1960 and the contemporaneous share of pop-
ulation working in the agricultural sector is relatively strong (around 0.4)
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of abrupt reforms (e.g. after revolutions), changes relatively slowly over time2. Industrialized
and post-industrial economies tend to have higher levels of human capital and female labour
force participation, as well as more favorable attitudes towards gender equality, compared to
agricultural (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). The main reason for these different attitudes, is the
economic independence of women, which was greatly enhanced as an outcome of this process.
This argument follows the mechanism outlined in Galor et al. (2009), however I am more
interested in the direct effect that different types of agricultural production had, on female
labour force participation. In other words, increasing the economic autonomy of women should
have a direct effect on beliefs towards gender equality regardless of the type of society. This is
in line with arguments from Iversen and Rosenbluth (2011), in the sense that womens’ skills in
agricultural societies were not transferable making them less able to control their own livelihood
(as opposed to post-industrial societies giving them that transferability of skills), as well as Qian
(2008) who argues that when women in regions of China were given a comparative advantage in
agriculture related field (tea picking), this led to “higher weight in household decision making”
i.e. higher autonomy.
The historical presence of wheat agriculture and its long run effects, highlights the impor-
tance that differences in agricultural production can have on female labour force participation
and beliefs towards gender equality. Wheat production historically required lower labour input
requirements compared to other food crops (e.g. rice). Furthermore, it did not require as
much coordination with neighbouring farms, since it did not depend on irrigation networks,
but mainly relied on natural rainfall (Talhelm et al., 2014). Apart from periods of sowing and
harvesting, the growing season was relatively short (spring to fall), which led to periods of
extended absence for the male members of a household. Hence, women were (and most of the
time required to be) able to cultivate the crops themselves, since men would spend a seasonal
nomadic life, in order to take care of the cattle - securing food and access to water for it (Bates
and Lees, 1977; Moran, 1982). Wheat agriculture did not require a large amount of manpower
(apart from sowing and harvesting), therefore families in societies with wheat agriculture were
not highly dependent to each other (Ang and Fredriksson, 2017) and used to be more egalitar-
ian in their allocation of household tasks. This allowed smaller families to be able to produce
enough food on their own, since food crops (such as wheat) in general were subject to constant
returns of scale, and such regions (with constant returns of scale) were characterized by lower
levels of land inequality (Easterly, 2007). Similarly, food crops were best suited for temperate
2For example, correlations between values of land inequality from the 1960s and 1970s, with measures prior
to 1950 are high (around 0.65).
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climates, and such regions were characterized by lower land inequality (Frankema, 2010). Com-
bining the effects that differences in agricultural production had on land ownership inequality,
with the effect that such inequality had on female labour productivity, one can argue that
differences in agricultural production played a significant role on the economic independence of
women, leading to higher female labour force participation, as well as relative beliefs in favour
of such participation (Alesina and Giuliano, 2010).
The transition from agricultural to industrial and mainly post-industrial societies dramat-
ically increased the ability of women to join the labour force, and become economically inde-
pendent. Hence, societies characterized by lower levels of historical land inequality should have
a more favorable view towards gender equality beliefs, since women were more likely to become
economically independent from an earlier stage. On the other hand, in societies with higher
levels of historical land inequality that industrialized on a later stage, views towards gender
equality should be less favorable, due to the relevant – or entire – absence of jobs available
for women (outside of the household) that provided economic independency. Overall, I expect
that higher levels of historical land inequality have a negative effect on beliefs towards gender
equality, even after agriculture ceases to be the main driving force of economic growth, in line
with arguments made by both economists Nunn (2012) and anthropologists (Richerson and
Boyd, 2005) defining culture as a – mostly – slowly changing variable.
The indirect effect that historical land inequality had on gender equality through education
and human capital, should be mentioned as well. Societies that experienced higher levels of
land inequality, were less likely to invest earlier in education, due to lower demand for high
productivity workers. In other words, industrialization and early investment in education were
positively correlated (Galor and Tsiddon, 1997), thus societies with lower levels of land inequal-
ity – therefore lower amount of land elites able to influence educational reforms – were able to
invest earlier in education, since they were not depended as much on land productivity. This
early investment in education has been linked to early development of human capital promot-
ing institutions (Galor et al., 2009), leading to a divergence between societies and their growth
path. For instance, in regions where land ownership concentration was higher, enrollment rates
historically have been lower, in other words the expansion of primary schooling provided by the
state took longer, and empirical findings document this result either across countries (Kourtel-
los et al., 2013) or counties in nineteenth-century Prussia (Cinnirella and Hornung, 2016). The
need for a larger number of educated workers, in an increasingly diversified number of sec-
tors, allowed the higher participation of women in the labour force, thereby strengething their
economic autonomy, and consequently shifting beliefs towards gender equality in the long run.
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To sum up, historical differences in agricultural production played an important role de-
termining female labour participation and beliefs towards gender equality. Depending on ge-
ographical parameters, such as the type of crops that could be cultivated and whether only
constant returns of scale could be implemented, regions were characterized by different levels of
land (ownership) inequality. These differences in agricultural production affected female labour
force participation and their economic independence, specifically by increasing such participa-
tion in regions with constant returns of scale (and lower land inequality). Earlier land inequality
affected the transition from agricultural to industrial societies, a transition that increased the
opportunities for women’s economic independency either directly, due to the shift in the type
and number of occupations available to them, or indirectly, through the increased investment in
education resulting to higher levels of human capital. Therefore, one would expect that higher
levels of historical land inequality should have a negative effect on contemporaneous beliefs
towards gender equality, across different societies.
4 Data Description
4.1 Beliefs about Gender Equality
The data used for gender equality beliefs comes from the World Values Survey Longitudinal
data (WVS, 2014), and includes information from the fourth wave (1999) until the 6th wave
(2014). The sample includes 40 countries from the 4th wave, 58 from the 5th wave, and 60
countries for the 6th, for a total of 99 different countries. The main variable of interest is
the equality sub-index index (Y022), a variable created by averaging three variables related to
gender equality. The three variables measure beliefs towards female labour market participation
(C001), female political participation (D059), and female higher education (D060). In cases
of either one missing, the equality variable is a linear transformation of the two available
components. The exact formula is obtained by regressing the average of the three components
on the other two. A more detailed description of the formula can be found on the WVS database
site.3
For all questions, respondents are asked whether they (strongly) agree or disagree with a
given following statement. The questions are worded in such a way, that the more someone
disagrees with the statement, the higher the response scores in the gender equality index.
Analytical definitions are provided in the appendix (Table A1).
3Link for further details: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp
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The first variable related to gender equality (C001) is concerned with attitudes towards
female labour market participation. Specifically, respondents have to state whether they
agree/disagree with the following statement:“When jobs are scarce, men should have more
right to a job than women.”. Higher values of the variable C001, indicate higher levels of beliefs
in favour of gender equality related to labour market participation.
The second variable related to gender equality (D059) is concerned with attitudes towards
female political participation. Similarly, respondents have to state whether they agree/disagree
with the following statement:“On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.”.
Higher values of the variable D059, indicate higher levels of beliefs in favour of gender equality
related to political participation.
The third variable related to gender equality (D060) is concerned with attitudes towards
female education. Specifically, respondents have to state whether they agree/disagree with the
following statement: “A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.”.
Higher values of the variable D060, indicate higher levels of beliefs in favour of gender equality
related to education.
For all questions, I average the responses by country, for all available waves (4 to 6). The
original weight provided by each survey was used, and negative or null scores (indicating whether
the question was not asked or unwillingness of individual to respond), were not taken into
account. The final scale for each of the three variables (C001, D059, D060) is a ratio (i.e. from
0 to 1), describing the percentage of population supporting a view in favor of gender equality.
The correlation between these three variables that create the Gender Equality Scale (Y022), is
strongly positive and very high (above 0.8 and 0.9 as can be seen in Table A2 of the appendix4.
A global mapping of beliefs towards gender equality is reported in Figure 1. Higher values
are coded in deep red, while lower values have a less pronounced colour. Similar to findings from
the relevant literature, it is evident that a high degree of variation regarding gender equality
beliefs exists across countries. For instance, countries in Western Europe and Scandinavia (e.g.
Norway), along with North American ones (e.g. Canada) and Australia score higher in their
respective beliefs towards gender equality. The next section explores whether land gini scores
are related to this variation.
4Other correlations are reported in the appendix as well, for instance Table A3 reports correlations between
main variables over waves, and Table A4 only between different waves.
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Notes: Data taken from the Longitudinal World Values Survey database (2015). The Gender Equality
Index (Y022) is a combined Scale of the following three variables: C001 “When jobs are scarce, men should
have more right to a job than women” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). D059 “On
the whole, men make better political leaders than women do” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate
equality). D060 “A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl” (agreement coded low
- higher values indicate equality).
4.2 Land Inequality
The measurement of land ownership concentration (i.e. land inequality) is of central impor-
tance to understand whether this form of inequality led to different beliefs about gender equality
that can be traced even after the transition from agricultural to industrial and post-industrial
societies. One of the first detailed datasets used in growth literature, comes from Deininger and
Squire (1998) (hereafter, DS), who employ data taken from The Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation (FAO), a specialized agency of the United Nations focused on defeating hunger globally.
In general, FAO data are based on official ‘Agricultural Censuses’, conducted at the beginning
of each decade. Their dataset is based on the statistical Yearbook for the 1990 World Census
(FAO, 1997) and contains information about the distribution of land holdings. The focus on
land holdings is due to their ability to determine an individual’s productive capacity as well
as ability to invest, mainly in agricultural economies where land ownership is a major asset.
Similar measurements of land holdings defined as “all agricultural land assigned to a holder,
that is one or two persons, rather than a group, community, state, or distinct management unit
(in other words a farm)” (Frankema, 2010), have been used by economic historians. The data
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sources include both FAO reports on world census (with data from 1950 to 1990), as well as
the Institut International d’ Agriculture (IIA)’s International yearbook (IIA, 1936).
In these datasets (DS & Frankema), land is measured in size (either acres or hectares), and
the total agricultural area measured includes “all land that is part of a holding, i.e. arable land,
land under permanent crops, land under permanent meadows and pastures, wood and forest land,
and other land” (Table A1, Frankema, 2010). However, there is no correction for the quality
or type of land. Other shortcomings of these datasets, such as referring only to operational
rather than ownership distribution of the land, or not taking into account landlessness, should
be taken into account when it comes to the measurement of land ownership inequality.
An important contribution regarding the measurement of land ownership inequality comes
from (Erickson and Vollrath, 2004). While other measurements focused on inequality within
the group of landowners for each country (Deininger and Squire, 1998), they proposed a new
measurement, accounting for the total agricultural population, which focuses on the inequality
within the landholders as well as across the general population. The final measurement used
in this dataset is essentially combining data from DS with their measurement accounting for
landlessness. Once again, data from FAO are utilized, but instead of focusing on the land
holdings, this measurement divides the total agricultural population by the number of total
number of land holdings. Hence, by using this method it takes into account both inequality
within land owners and across the agricultural population, providing a more nuanced picture
of land ownership inequality, labelled overall Land Gini. This measurement has been used ex-
tensively (e.g. Galor et al., 2006; Vollrath and Erickson, 2007; Vollrath, 2008) and, by including
landlessness, certainly provides a better description of land ownership inequality.
The main variable used for the analysis is a Land Gini (Vollrath Land Gini), and measures
the inequality in land ownership, similar to the gini coeffiecient used to describe income in-
equality across 99 countries, primarily from 1960s and 1970s (up to 1990), taken from (Vollrath
and Erickson, 2007). Hence, for higher values of Land Gini, there is a less equal distribution
of land holdings in each country (i.e. inequality). The final measurement used contains values
from 0 to 1, similar to income Gini measurements. It should be noted that the vast majority
of values is higher than 0.6, due to certain methodologies followed by the authors 5. A global
mapping of land inequality is reported in Figure 2. Higher scores of land inequality are coloured
in deep blue, while lower scores are coloured in ligher shades. Apart from the variation, one can
observe the mismatch between data available for gender beliefs, and data for land inequality.
5More information regarding the exact methodology can be found in Vollrath (2007), or in the following link:
https://sites.google.com/site/dietrichvollrath/landdistfinance
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Notes: Data taken from Vollrath 2007, originally from Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) database.
FAO is a specialized agency of the United Nations focused on defeating hunger globally, and their data comes
from official agricultural censuses, conducted on the beginning of each decade. Higher scores indicate higher
levels of land ownership concentration, i.e. land inequality.
The variation of beliefs towards gender equality across countries from the Vollrath sample is
reported in Figure 3. While both samples before merge happen to have 99 different countries,
the overlap between the two samples is not as significant as one would expect, leading to a final
sample of 55 countries. Only countries with available information from both the WVS and the
Land Gini measurement from Vollrath and Erickson (2007) are reported. Once again, a high
degree of variation exists across countries. For instance, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have the
lowest scores on the Gender Equality Scale (below 0.4), while countries like Sweden or Norway
are at the top of the distribution with scores above 0.8.
The correlations between Vollrath Land Gini and Gender Equality variables are reported
in Figure 4. The upper left panel describes the relationship between the Gender Equality Scale
(Y022) from WVS and Land Gini. As described earlier, the Gender Equality Scale consists of
three variables measuring beliefs towards female labour participation (C001), female political
participation (D059), and female educational attainment (D060). The relationship of each of
those variables is reported in the other three diagrams. The upper right panel describes the
relationship between the belief in female labour participation (C001) and land inequality, the
bottom left between the belief in female political participation (D059) and land inequality, and
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Figure 3: Gender Equality Index by Country
Notes: Data taken from the Longitudinal World Values Survey database (2015). The Gender Equality
Index (Y022) is a combined Scale of the following three variables: C001 “When jobs are scarce, men should
have more right to a job than women” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). D059 “On
the whole, men make better political leaders than women do” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate
equality). D060 “A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl” (agreement coded low
- higher values indicate equality).
the bottom right between belief in female educational attainment (D060) and land inequality.
The relationship between each of the variables measuring beliefs towards Gender Equality and
Land Inequality is negative, indicating that for higher levels of land inequality during the earlier
years (1960-1970), a lower level of support towards gender equality beliefs exists in latter periods
(1990-2014). To further analyze this relationship, other factors should be taken into account,
which is done in the next section.
Before that however, two additional measurements of land inequality are described below,
to be used for robustness checks later on. The first is once again a land gini (Frank Land Gini),
which comes from Frankema (2010), and includes data on land holdings from 1950 to 1990
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Figure 4: Correlations between Gender Equality and Land Inequality
Notes: Land Gini Measurements from Vollrath (2007), measuring Land inequality, taking into account
Landlessness. Higher values of Land Gini indicate inequality of land ownership. Gender Equality Index is a
combined scale from the World Values Survey, consisting of the following three variables: C001 “When jobs
are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate
equality); D059 “On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do” (agreement coded low -
higher values indicate equality); D060 “A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl”
(agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). The correlation of the three variables (C001, D059
and D060) ranges from 0.83 to 0.93.
for a few more countries (101). While this variable has a few more observations and is very
similar to the main variable (Vollrath Land Gini), the land inequality measured is only focused
on within land owners rather than across the population. Hence, it is not reflecting inequality
in the distribution of land holdings as well as the main variable, but similar effects should be
expected on beliefs towards gender equality.
The second complimentary measurement, comes from the extensive work of Vanhanen (2009)
on measurements of Democracy. This dataset includes a variable measuring the percentage of
family farms in different countries. On the one hand, it includes data that goes all the way back
to the 1850s, and for later years (1950+), there are more countries (177) in this sample from the
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FAO data. On the other hand, the measurement comes from combining evidence from country
censuses accounting for ownership by family, rather than farm size i.e. depending on the size
of the country, the median family farm size differs. This contrasts the data from FAO, which
measure actual size of the land holdings, in detailed censuses focused exclusively on agricultural
measurements. The measurement is weaker than the land gini measurements analyzed earlier
for a couple of reasons. First, the information is obtained from general censuses that had a
broad focus measuring variables unrelated to land agriculture (e.g. political institutions across
time) therefore measurement errors are more likely. Second, it compares average farm size
across different countries, instead of taking into account inequality within them, in other words
reports whether fewer family farms existed in a country, rather than how the land size was
distributed (like in the land gini measurements).
Overall, percentage of family farms is included as an additional complimentary proxy of land
ownership inequality, along with the main measurement from Vollrath (Vollrath Land Gini -
Land Gini accounting for landlessness) and the additional from Frankema (Frank Land Gini -
Land holdings Gini). Higher values of this variable (Family Farms) indicate a higher level of
equality (i.e. less inequality). Like the other land inequality variables, it takes values from 0
to 1. Even if this measurement may not be as consistent as land gini measures, it’s conceptual
similarity provides an additional proxy for land inequality nonetheless.
5 Empirical Analysis - Macro Sample
5.1 Empirical Strategy
This section analyzes the empirical strategy used to describe the relationship between his-
torical Land Inequality and contemporary beliefs towards Gender Equality. In order to further
explore the relationship, the following ordinary least squares empirical specification is estimated:
Beliefi = β1V ollrath Ginii + β2Plowi + β3GDPi + β4Xi + ǫi (1)
where Beliefi is one of the four measurements of Gender Equality taken from the World
Values Survey (i.e. Belief in Gender Equality, Belief towards female labour force participa-
tion, higher education attendance, political participation), in country i, averaged for the period
between 1999-20146. V ollrath Ginii is the Gini coefficient measuring Land ownership concen-
tration in country i, and is taken from Vollrath and Erickson (2007). Following their approach,
6The distribution of this variable is reported at Figure A1
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only the earliest value of each country’s Land Gini is used, and for the vast majority of countries
the Gini coefficient is from the 1960s and 1970s. A negative sign of the coefficient β1 should be
expected, indicating that for higher values of historical Land Inequality (in the 1960s and 70s),
there is a lower average contemporary belief in favor of Gender Equality in country i.
The main control variables are historical usage of plough agriculture and GDP per capita.
Plough measurements are taken from Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn (2013), and originally come
from the Ethnographic Atlas, an ethnicity-level database containing information for 1265 eth-
nic groups around the world, which was subsequently simplified in order to provide cultural
measurements for 186 cultural provinces, referred to as the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample
(Murdock, 1967)7. The measurement used is constructed by assigning the value of 1 if plough
agriculture was exercised during the time that an ethnic group was firstly observed, and zero
otherwise. Afterwards, the scores from each ethnic group are matched with corresponding pres-
ence of the groups in modern countries. The final Plowi variable takes values from 0 to 1, where
a higher score indicates earlier historical usage of plough from ethnic groups present in country
i. Results from relevant literature (Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn, 2013), indicate that the pres-
ence of historical plough agriculture had a negative effect on beliefs towards gender equality.
Controlling for it will ensure that such effects have been taken into account. GDP per capita
measurements are taken from the Quality of Governance 2018 database (QOG et al., 2018).
The GDPi variable is averaging for the period 1990 to 2014, for country i, and is measured in
gross domestic product converted to International Dollars using purchasing power parity rates,
for constant prices of 2011 International Dollars. GDP per capita has a positive effect on beliefs
towards gender equality (Inglehart and Norris, 2003), at least on average, hence controlling for
is necessary. Other controls include continental and geographical controls, such as whether
a country is landlocked, which is taken from Michalopoulos (2012), originally taken from the
Global Development Network Growth Database, and information on latitude and longtitude
taken from Nunn (2012).
Table 1 summarizes the information for countries used in the baseline analysis, from the
Vollrath dataset. Information relevant to subsequent analysis (i.e. instrumental variables and
complimentary measurements of land inequality), is included as well. The five columns report
the number of observations, the mean of the variable, the standard deviation, as well as the
minimum and maximum value of each.
One can easily observe, that while land Gini measurements from Vollrath are available for
99 countries, only 55 of those countries match with data from the World Values Survey. The
7More information about the atlas can be found on: http://eclectic.ss.uci.edu/ drwhite/worldcul/atlas.htm
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Macro Sample (Vollrath Dataset)
n mean sd min max
Equality - (Y022) 55 0.583 0.159 0.283 0.858
JSC - (C001) 55 0.552 0.221 0.140 0.948
WPL - (D059) 55 0.521 0.163 0.165 0.807
UIG - (D060) 55 0.672 0.114 0.377 0.900
Vollrath Gini 99 0.832 0.130 0.229 0.996
Frank Land Gini 101 0.601 0.152 0.291 0.865
Family Farms 177 0.409 0.221 0.002 0.934
Plough 96 0.549 0.471 0.000 1.000
Landlocked 91 0.165 0.373 0.000 1.000
Latitude 97 19.133 24.427 -41.806 64.481
Longitude 97 7.297 66.616 -112.982 171.478
Log GDP 92 9.457 1.172 6.512 11.406
Terrain Rugged Slope 97 3.826 3.414 0.108 17.595
Notes: Gender Equality Index (Y022) is a combined scale from the World Values Survey, consisting of the
following three variables: C001 “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women”
(agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality); D059 “On the whole, men make better political
leaders than women do” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality) ; D060 “A university
education is more important for a boy than for a girl” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate
equality). Land Gini Measurements from Vollrath and Erickson (2007), measuring Land inequality,
taking into account Landlessness. Land Gini from Frankema from Frankema (2010), measuring Land
inequality. Both Measurements originally taken from FAO database (Food and Agricultural Organization
of the United Nations), and measure Land Holdings by size in acres. Family Farms measurements taken
from Vanhanen (2009) and measure the ratio of family farms in each country. Plough measurement
is taken from Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013), and measures the degree of Plough usage across
countries. Continental Dummies are taken from Galor et al. (2009). Landlock indicators are taken from
Michalopoulos (2012), source: Global Development Network Growth Database. Latitude and Longtitude
variables are taken from Nunn (2012). GDP per Capita, ppp (constant 2011 international U.S. Dollars)
is taken from Quality of Governence Database (2018). Terrain Rugged Slope is a measure of terrain
ruggedness (average slope, %) for each country, and is taken from Nunn (2012).
variables measuring beliefs towards Gender Equality are named after their respective descrip-
tions. For the belief relating to female labour participation (i.e. question on whether when
jobs are scarce men should be given priority over women), the variable is named JSC (original
WVS code in parenthesis - C001). The belief related to political participation (i.e. question
on whether men make better political leaders than women), the variable is named WPL (orig-
inal WVS code in parenthesis - D059). Finally, the belief related to university attainment (i.e.
question on whether a university education is more important for a boy than a girl) the variable
is named UIG (original WVS code in parenthesis - D060).
5.2 Baseline Results
The baseline results from the empirical OLS specification, describing the effect of Land
Inequality on contemporary beliefs towards Gender Equality across countries are reported in
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Table 2. For each case, only the β1 coefficient of interest is reported, in order to fit all results in
one table8. Each line reports the effect of the same independent variable (i.e. Vollrath Gini), on
a different belief towards Gender Equality. The first line is the Gender Equality Index that is
computed as an average of the other three variables. The second line is the belief towards female
labour force participation, namely the variable JSC. The third line is the belief towards female
political participation, namely the variable WPL. The fourth line is the belief towards female
higher education attendance, namely the variable UIG. Column (1) shows the negative effect
of Land Ownership Inequality on all 4 contemporary beliefs towards Gender Equality, after
controlling for continental fixed effects. Specifically, for the first line of column (1), an increase
of one standard deviation of Vollrath Land Gini coefficient (i.e. an historical presence of higher
land inequality), results in a roughly 0.56 standard deviation decrease in the average belief in
favor of Gender Equality. The effect is significant at the 1% level, and has a t-value above
5. Similar results across all three variables are reported in the second, third and fourth line
of column (1), documenting the negative effect of historical Land inequality on contemporary
beliefs towards Gender Equality - variables JSC, WPL and UIG respectively.
Column (2) adds controls for Geographical characteristics of each country. In particular,
dummies for being landlocked, and the absolute longtitude and latitude are added alongside
the Continental controls. The effect of Land Inequality on all beliefs towards Gender Equality
remains negative and statistically significant on the 1% level, albeit with a lower t-value, even
after taking into account geographical characteristics. All three remaining variables measuring
beliefs towards Gender Equality (i.e. JSC, WPL and UIG) are affected by the additional
controls in the same way, thus a small derease in magnitude of the effect, but no change in
statistical significance, other than a lower t-value.
Column (3) adds GDP per capita measurements as an additional control. This is an impor-
tant control since it has been shown in political science literature (Inglehart and Norris, 2003)
that there is a positive correlation between GDP per capita and beliefs in favour of Gender
Equality, therefore it is important to see whether controlling for GDP affects the results. Re-
assuringly, the effect of Land Inequality on beliefs towards Gender Equality remains negative
and statistically significant at the 1% level, while being very similar in magnitude, with an
almost identical t-value like the earlier column. The effect is the same for the rest of the three
variables, as all remain negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.
Finally, column (4) adds the historical presence of plough agriculture to the list of controls.
The effect of Land Inequality on beliefs towards Gender Equality remains similarly negative
8Regressions with all the variables can be found in the appendix, TablesA5, A6, A7, and A8
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Table 2: OLS Estimates of Land Inequality on Beliefs about Gender Equality - Macro Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continental Geographical GDP All Controls
Equality (Y022)
Vollrath Gini -0.564*** -0.533*** -0.536*** -0.511***
(-5.86) (-4.45) (-4.44) (-4.05)
Adjusted R2 0.743 0.764 0.760 0.760
JSC (C001)
Vollrath Gini -0.682*** -0.606*** -0.613*** -0.582***
(-4.72) (-3.08) (-3.13) (-2.90)
Adjusted R2 0.658 0.664 0.659 0.656
WPL (D059)
Vollrath Gini -0.594*** -0.567*** -0.573*** -0.564***
(-5.47) (-4.52) (-4.44) (-4.17)
Adjusted R2 0.721 0.769 0.767 0.762
UIG (D060)
Vollrath Gini -0.486*** -0.484*** -0.481*** -0.443***
(-4.59) (-3.66) (-3.55) (-3.25)
Adjusted R2 0.664 0.659 0.653 0.671
Observations 55 55 55 55
Continetal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical No Yes Yes Yes
GDP/capita No No Yes Yes
P loughAgriculture No No No Yes
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Land Gini is a ratio measuring
the Inequality in Land ownership taking into account Landlessness, and the variable is from Vollrath
and Erickson (2007). Originally taken from FAO database (Food and Agricultural Organization of the
United Nations), and measures Land Holdings by size in acres. Y022 is the Gender Equality Index, a
combined scale from the World Values Survey, consisting of the following three variables: JSC (C001)
“When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” (agreement coded low - higher
values indicate equality). WPL (D059) “On the whole, men make better political leaders than women
do” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). UIG (D060) “A university education is
more important for a boy than for a girl” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). GDP is
measured in log GDP per capita, ppp (constant 2011 international U.S. Dollars) and is taken from Quality
of Governence Database (2018). Plough measures the degree of historical Plough usage, and is taken from
Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013).
and statistically significant at the 1% level, even though both the magnitude and the t-values
decrease. An increase of one standard deviation of the Gini coeffiecient, results in a 0.51
standard deviation decrease in the average belief in favor of Gender Equality. The other three
variables (JSC, WPL and UIG) are affected in the same way, but all remain negative and
statistically significant at the 1% level. 9
9I checked for Income Inequality by adding the Gini coefficient from the World Bank Indicators as an
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Overall, the effect of historical Land Inequality (land ownership concentration) on contem-
porary beliefs in favour of Gender Equality, appears to be negative. Since there is a time gap
between the measurements of Land Inequality across countries (early 1960s and 1970s), and
the data from the World Values Survey (after 1980s and until early 2010s), one may argue that
reverse causality concerns are mitigated. Nonetheless, I proceed by exploiting a possible in-
strument, in order to establish that Land Inequality has a direct effect on beliefs about Gender
Equality, and that this effect is more than a correlation.
5.3 Baseline Results - Instrumental Variable Approach
In this section I analyze a possible instrument used to explain the effect of Land Inequality
on beliefs towards Gender Equality, and report the relevant results. In general, instrumental
variables try to mediate problems that arise with OLS estimation, primarily issues such as
reverse causality, measurement errors and biased estimates. While such endogeneity concerns
can not be completely eradicated, instruments that arguably affect the dependent variable (in
this case cultural norms), only through their effect on the main independent variable (in this
case land inequality), and are not correlated with the error term of the explanatory equation,
satisfy the exclusion restriction. In other words, parameters that can plausibly provide an
exogenous variation (therefore reducing endogeneity concerns), are utilized in instrumental
variable analysis. For instance, such exogeneity can be provided by geographical realities,
especially since the main dependent variable of the analysis is related with agriculture.
Geographical parameters have been used in relevant literature, in order to analyze the im-
pact of agricultural factors on cultural norms. For instance, (Alesina, Giuliano, and Nunn,
2013), use a distinction between the type of crops suitable for plough agriculture. They show
that in plough-positive agricultural environments, the usage of plough agriculture was (some-
what unsurprisingly) greater than other environments. In other words, they document the
effect of a change on cultural norms (e.g. belief towards female labour participation) due to
the usage of plough agriculture, through an exogenous environmental parameter that satisfies
the exclusion restriction (i.e. plough-positive soil only affects the cultural norms through its
impact on the adoptation of plough agriculture in a society). Following a similar approach, the
instrument I propose is that of terrain ruggedness and specifically whether the average slope of
the each country can be used as an exogenous instrument.
additional control, and the results remain significant. However, since its inclusion severely limits the sample
from 55 to 41 countries, it is excluded from the reported results.
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Terrain ruggedness has been used by economists and political scientists studying various
topics ranging from financial diversification (Ramcharan, 2006), civil war and conflict (Fearon
and Laitin, 2003) , to social capital (Olken, 2009) and development (Nunn and Puga, 2012).
Our particular interest lies in its adverse effects on cultivation, specifically through the effect
of ruggedness on irrigation (FAO, 1993), as well as increasing transportation costs (Bryant,
Michael, and John, Bryant et al.). One recent study by Baten and Hippe (2018) , finds a
positive, though weak effect, of ruggedness on land ownership concentration, for regional Europe
in the early 1900s. However, studies have shown that terrain ruggedness may have disparate
effects, depending on regional and historical parameters. For instance Nunn and Puga (2012),
find that while terrain ruggedness has a negative direct effect on income for most countries
around the world, when analyzing development in African countries there is positive effect on
income, due to historical events. Specifically, the presence of many hills, caves and cliff walls
provided hiding places for those fleeing from slave traders. In a similar manner, analyzing the
effect of different levels of terrain ruggedness within regions, may be different than comparing
the average level within countries, and their effect on land inequality. In other words, depending
on the unit of comparison, findings that seem counterintuitive may provide a meaningful tool.
The data on terrain ruggedness is taken from Nunn (2008), and originally comes from the
US (1996) Geological Survey and Riley et al. (1999). It comprises of the average grid cells
in a country and the difference in altitude they have with corresponding neighbouring 30-arc-
second cells. In essence, the calculation averages the distance from 8 different grid cells (and
their altitude), and takes the square root of all differences to create the measurement for each
cell. The distance between two adjacent grid points is half a nautical mile or 926 meters. The
final measurement for each country averages all cells within the country, taking into account
only those not covered in water, to create a comparable cross country variable.
Table 3 summarizes the results from the IV model. The controls are added in the same
order as in the OLS model10. Column (1) controls for continental effects. Column (2) adds
geographical effects. Column (3) adds GDP per capita measurements, and finally, column (4)
adds historical usage of plough agriculture. The results are similar with the OLS model, at least
for the effect of Land Gini on the average belief towards Gender Equality, reported in the first
line. The effect of Land Gini on beliefs towards Gender Equality is negative and statistically
significant on the 1% level, albeit with a larger effect than the OLS estimation. The effect is
similar on the other two beliefs towards female political participation (WPL) and belief towards
female higher education attendance (UIG). As reported in the third and fourth line, the effect
10Regressions with additional controls can be found in the appendix, Table A9
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is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The only exception comes from the
effect of Land Gini on the belief towards female labour participation (JSC), where the effects
becomes marginally insignificant and significant, depending on the controls added. However it
still remains negative throught all specifications, and column (4), which includes all controls,
is marginally statistically significant at the 10% level.
The first stage estimates are reported on the lower part of Table 3. Terrain ruggedness,
in particular the average slope index measurements, has a negative effect on the Land Gini
coefficient. This may seem counterintuitive at first, but going back to findings from literature
may provide an argument explaining this finding. Rather than comparing regions of a few
countries as in Baten and Hippe (2018), the unit of comparison here is countries, and terrain
ruggedness has been shown to have different effects depending on historical differences Nunn and
Puga (2012) 11. Furthermore, certain geographical constraints, such as the frequent presence
of mountains and hills, made the practical aspects of organizing and implementing economies
of scale harder (e.g. irrigation networks), hence leading to lower levels of land inequality
distribution.
Finally, it seems like a reasonable assumption - in line with the exclusion restriction, that
ruggedness affects agriculture directly, and is not connected with comtemporary beliefs, other
than through its effect on Land Inequality. Concerning the statistical significance of the instru-
ment, the F-test value is reported for all columns, in the first line of the lower part of the table.
While in the first column it starts around 7, it moves above 10 for the rest of the specifications,
and remains above 10, even after adding historical usage of plough agriculture as a control
in column (4). This satisfies the criteria of relevance of the instrument, meaning that terrain
ruggedness (slope) is an relatively strong instrument for the effect of Land Gini on beliefs to-
wards Gender Equality. In conclusion, terrain ruggedness appears to be a viable instrument
connecting the negative effect of land inequality on beliefs towards gender equality. To further
strengthen the baseline findings, I employ alternative measurements of land inequality in the
next section, to further analyze its effect on beliefs towards gender equality.
5.4 Robustness Analysis - Alternative measurements
In this section I provide results from complimentary measurements of Land Inequality.
Specifically, I employ measurements of land gini from Frankema (2010), and family farms from
11Another aspect that should be taken into account is that the correlation of terrain ruggedness and Land
Gini (while always negative) varies significantly amongst different continents.
25
Table 3: IV Estimates of Land Inequality on Gender Equality - Instrument is ruggedness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continental Geographical GDP All Controls
Equality (Y022)
Vollrath Gini -0.820*** -0.902*** -0.910*** -0.893***
(-2.613) (-2.979) (-2.950) (-2.903)
R2 0.210 0.295 0.295 0.309
JSC (C001)
Vollrath Gini -0.684 -0.817* -0.832* -0.806*
(-1.349) (-1.770) (-1.778) (-1.712)
R2 0.170 0.223 0.229 0.239
WPL (D059)
Vollrath Gini -1.055*** -1.149*** -1.163*** -1.167***
(-3.240) (-3.771) (-3.784) (-3.735)
R2 0.102 0.265 0.268 0.266
UIG (D060)
Vollrath Gini -0.766*** -0.796*** -0.791*** -0.761***
(-2.640) (-2.870) (-2.873) (-2.868)
R2 0.190 0.244 0.248 0.295
Continetal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical No Yes Yes Yes
GDP No No Yes Yes
P loughAgriculture No No No Yes
First stage estimates Vollrath Gini
Terrain Rugged Slope -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011***
(-2.784) (-3.617) (-3.570) (-3.395)
First stage F-stat 7.753 13.080 12.741 11.525
Underidentification test: Kleibergen-Paap rk LMstatistic 0.027 0.027 0.025 0.028
Observations 55 55 55 55
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Terrain Rugged Slope is a measure of
terrain ruggedness (average slope, %) for each country, and is taken from Nunn (2012). Land Gini is a ratio
measuring the Inequality in Land ownership taking into account Landlessness, and the variable is from
Vollrath and Erickson (2007). Originally taken from FAO database (Food and Agricultural Organization
of the United Nations), and measures Land Holdings by size in acres. Y022 is the Gender Equality Index,
a combined scale from the World Values Survey, consisting of the following three variables: JSC (C001)
”When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” (agreement coded low - higher
values indicate equality). WPL (D059) ”On the whole, men make better political leaders than women
do” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). UIG (D060) ”A university education is
more important for a boy than for a girl” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). GDP
is measured in log GDP per capita, ppp (constant 2011 international U.S. Dollars) and is taken from
Quality of Governence Database (2018). Plough measures the degree of historical Plough usage, and is
taken from Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013).
Vanhanen (2009), and analyze their impact on beliefs towards Gender Equality.
Table 4 reports the results for the Frankema Land Gini measurement. Like Vollrath Gini,
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Table 4: OLS Estimates of Land Inequality (II) on Beliefs about Gender Equality WVS
(Macro Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continental Geographical GDP All Controls
Equality (Y022)
Frank Land Gini -0.275** -0.283** -0.287** -0.287**
(-2.57) (-2.18) (-2.24) (-2.21)
Adjusted R2 0.675 0.695 0.689 0.683
JSC (C001)
Frank Land Gini -0.412*** -0.465** -0.464** -0.464**
(-2.71) (-2.38) (-2.42) (-2.39)
Adjusted R2 0.600 0.611 0.603 0.595
WPL (D059)
Frank Land Gini -0.331*** -0.333** -0.329** -0.330**
(-2.83) (-2.54) (-2.56) (-2.53)
Adjusted R2 0.691 0.728 0.723 0.718
UIG (D060)
Frank Land Gini -0.105 -0.0669 -0.0809 -0.0812
(-1.27) (-0.68) (-0.85) (-0.84)
Adjusted R2 0.541 0.544 0.555 0.546
Observations 58 58 58 58
Continetal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical No Yes Yes Yes
GDP/capita No No Yes Yes
P loughAgriculture No No No Yes
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Frank Land Gini is a ratio measuring
the Inequality in Land owernship, for the period from 1950 to 1990, and is taken from Frankema (2010).
Originally taken from FAO database (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations), and
measures Land Holdings by size in acres. Y022 is the Gender Equality Index, a combined scale from
the World Values Survey, consisting of the following three variables: C001 “When jobs are scarce, men
should have more right to a job than women” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality).
D059 “On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do” (agreement coded low - higher
values indicate equality). D060 “A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl”
(agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). GDP is measured in log GDP per capita, ppp
(constant 2011 international U.S. Dollars) and is taken from Quality of Governence Database (2018).
Plough measures the degree of historical Plough usage, and is taken from Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn
(2013).
this variable measures the land inequality within each country in terms of land ownership of
arable land, but focuses only the inequality amongst landowners. The analysis is identical to
the baseline, therefore similar negative effects of Land Inequality on beliefs towards Gender
Equality are expected.
Each column adds the same controls as with the baseline results, and each row describes
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the effect of land inequality on a different variable of beliefs towards gender equality. The
order of the rows describing beliefs is the following: index of Beliefs regarding Gender Equality,
beliefs towards female labour participation, beliefs towards female political participation, and
beliefs towards female higher education attendance. The four columns add controls in the same
way as in the baseline measurement, hence column (1) for continental controls, column (2)
for geographical controls, column (3) for GDP per capita, and column (4) adds the historical
presence of plough agriculture as a control variable. For all specifications and all variables
(apart from beliefs towards female higher education attendance - UIG), the effect of Land
Inequality on beliefs towards Gender Equality is negative and statistically significant at the
5% level. These findings are in line with the baseline results reported in the previous section,
describing a negative effect of land inequality on beliefs towards Gender Equality.
Table 5 reports the results for the complimetary measurement of family farms from Van-
hanen (2009). This measurement differs from the land gini utilized earlier, in the sense that
higher values of family farms indicate lower levels of land inequality. Hence, a reserve effect
(positive) of family farms on beliefs towards Gender Equality is expected.
The order of the results is identical to the previous measurement (and baseline results),
with each row reporting a different belief (index of Gender Equality, beliefs towards female
labour participation, female political participation and female higher education attendance),
and each column adding an additional control (continental, geographical, GDP, and historical
plough usage) to each specification. As reported earlier, data for family farms are available for
more countries, increasing the total sample to 88 countries. The effect of higher percentage
of family farms on beliefs towards Gender Equality (as well as each other belief), is positive
and statistically significant on the 1% level. This result further reinforces the baseline findings,
showing that even alternative measurements of land distribution appear to have an effect on
beliefs towards Gender Equality.
5.5 Robustness Analysis - OLS extended
In this section I provide further robustness checks, to see how the baseline results are affected
when more controls are added in the OLS specification. Table 6 summarizes the results from
this process12. Columns (1) and (2) repeat the analysis in the baseline macro sample, using the
same Continental and Geographical controls respectively. Column (3) now adds the religious
fractionalization of a country as an additional control. In general, more tolerant and free
12Regressions with all the variables can be found in the appendix, Tables A10, A11, A12, and A13
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Table 5: OLS Estimates of Family Farms on Beliefs about Gender Equality WVS (Macro
Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continental Geographical GDP All Controls
Equality (Y022)
Family Farms 0.158*** 0.173*** 0.171*** 0.175***
(4.09) (4.01) (3.78) (3.90)
Adjusted R2 0.586 0.597 0.592 0.590
JSC (C001)
Family Farms 0.156*** 0.173*** 0.174*** 0.183***
(2.92) (2.86) (2.80) (2.97)
Adjusted R2 0.519 0.523 0.517 0.517
WPL (D059)
Family Farms 0.208*** 0.231*** 0.236*** 0.243***
(4.86) (4.79) (4.53) (4.79)
Adjusted R2 0.570 0.601 0.597 0.600
UIG (D060)
Family Farms 0.121*** 0.122*** 0.116*** 0.113***
(3.79) (3.62) (3.17) (3.05)
Adjusted R2 0.482 0.470 0.468 0.463
Observations 88 88 88 88
Continetal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical No Yes Yes Yes
GDP/capita No No Yes Yes
P loughAgriculture No No No Yes
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Family Farms measurements taken
from Vanhanen (2009) and measure the ratio of family farms in each country for the period 1950-1998. A
higher value of the variable indicates a higher percentage of population owns property (existence of more
family farms) , which translates to lower inequality in land ownership. Y022 is the Gender Equality Index,
a combined scale from the World Values Survey, consisting of the following three variables: C001 “When
jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” (agreement coded low - higher values
indicate equality). D059 “On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do” (agreement
coded low - higher values indicate equality). D060 “A university education is more important for a boy
than for a girl” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). GDP is measured in log GDP per
capita, ppp (constant 2011 international U.S. Dollars) and is taken from Quality of Governence Database
(2018). Plough measures the degree of historical Plough usage, and is taken from Alesina, Giuliano and
Nunn (2013).
societies have a higher score of religious fractionalization (Alesina et al., 2003), which may
affect beliefs towards Gender Equality, and alter the robustness of the baseline specification.
The measurement is taken from (Michalopoulos, 2012), and does not match the total sample
perfectly, leading to a decline from 55 to 53 countries. However, the results are still similar
with the earlier columns, showing a negative efffect of Land Gini on the average beliefs towards
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Gender Equality (reported in the first line), and statistically significant at the 1% level. An
increase of one standard deviation in the Land Gini coefficient, results in a 0.53 standard
deviation decrease in the average belief towards Gender Equality. The same negative effect
remains for the rest of the beliefs regarding female labour force participation (JSC), female
political participation (WPL), and female higher education attendance (UIG), which are all
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.
Column (4) adds Legal origins of the country as an additional control. Arguably, the
legal norms that characterize each country, have an effect on social norms and are important
determinants of cultural beliefs (Nunn, 2012). The measurements are taken from (Nunn, 2012),
and include whether a country has a history of French, Socialist, German or Scandinavian law
origin, keeping English law as the reference point. Adding Legal origins affects the strength of
the results, even though the effect of Land Gini on beliefs towards Gender Equality (first line),
remain negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The t-value is smaller though,
dropping below 3 points. In other words, now an increase of one standard deviation in the Gini
coefficient, leads to a 0.40 standard deviation decrease in the average beliefs towards Gender
Equality score. Furthermore, the other three variables measuring the effect of Land Gini on
specific beliefs towards Gender Equality, have a more pronounced effect after the inclusion of
Legal origins. For one, regarding the belief towards female labour force participation (JSC), the
variable of Land Gini is now only significant on the 10% level, and the magnitude of the effect is
almost reduced in half. The effect on the belief towards female political participation (WPL),
is significant at the 5% level, while the effect on the belief towards female higher education
attainment is the only one that remains statistically significant on the 1% level. Overall, the
inclusion of Legal origins weakens the effect, even though the main variable (belief towards
Gender Equality) remains negative and statistically significant in the 1% level.
Column (5) adds Colonial origins of the country as an additional control, to take into
account the effect of colonial rule in institutional settings of different societies, which have
been central in the development of institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001). The interplay between
institutions and cultural norms has been established in relevant literature as well (Nunn, 2012).
Hence, measurements regarding the colonial origins of each country are included, in order to
ensure that the results are not driven by such factors. Specifically, controls measuring British,
French, Portuguese and other European colonial rule are added, keeping Spanish colonial rule
as a reference point. The effect of Land Gini on average beliefs towards Gender Equality
remains negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, while the magnitude slightly
increases, along with the t-value. An increase of one standard deviation in the Gini coefficient
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Table 6: OLS Estimates of Land Inequality on Beliefs about Gender Equality - More Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Continental Geographical Fractional Legal Colonial GDP All Controls
Equality (Y022)
Vollrath Gini -0.564*** -0.533*** -0.539*** -0.409*** -0.463*** -0.437*** -0.363**
(-5.86) (-4.45) (-4.72) (-2.79) (-2.89) (-2.78) (-2.49)
Adjusted R2 0.743 0.764 0.794 0.795 0.818 0.832 0.844
JSC (C001)
Vollrath Gini -0.682*** -0.606*** -0.597*** -0.378* -0.459** -0.417* -0.310
(-4.72) (-3.08) (-3.26) (-1.82) (-2.13) (-1.99) (-1.69)
Adjusted R2 0.658 0.664 0.696 0.703 0.738 0.758 0.768
WPL (D059)
Vollrath Gini -0.594*** -0.567*** -0.596*** -0.420** -0.484*** -0.450** -0.392**
(-5.47) (-4.52) (-4.80) (-2.33) (-2.83) (-2.62) (-2.25)
Adjusted R2 0.721 0.769 0.781 0.777 0.833 0.862 0.868
UIG (D060)
Vollrath Gini -0.486*** -0.484*** -0.482*** -0.447*** -0.440** -0.438** -0.375**
(-4.59) (-3.66) (-3.47) (-2.80) (-2.46) (-2.43) (-2.11)
Adjusted R2 0.664 0.659 0.672 0.668 0.632 0.622 0.632
Observations 55 55 53 53 53 53 53
Continetal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Relig Fractionalization No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legal Origins No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
ColonialOrigins No No No No Yes Yes Yes
GDP/capita No No No No No Yes Yes
P loughAgriculture No No No No No No Yes
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Land Gini is a ratio measuring the
Inequality in Land ownership taking into account Landlessness, and the variable is from Vollrath and Erickson
(2007). Originally taken from FAO database (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations), and
measures Land Holdings by size in acres. Y022 is the Gender Equality Index, a combined scale from the World
Values Survey, consisting of the following three variables: JSC (C001) ”When jobs are scarce, men should
have more right to a job than women” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). WPL (D059)
”On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate
equality). UIG (D060) ”A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl” (agreement coded
low - higher values indicate equality). Fractionalization measures the amount of ethnic, religious and linguistic
homogeneity in a country, and is taken from Alesina (2001). Legal origins is an indicator, taking different values
with respect to the legal tradition that influenced a given country (e.g. British, French, Socialist etc.) and is
taken from Nunn (2012). Colonial origins is an indicator, taking different values with respect to the country
that may had colonized a given country (e.g. Spanish, British etc.) and is taken from Acemoglu (2001). GDP
is measured in log GDP per capita, ppp (constant 2011 international U.S. Dollars) and is taken from Quality of
Governence Database (2018). Plough measures the degree of historical Plough usage, and is taken from Alesina,
Giuliano and Nunn (2013).
now leads to a 0.46 standard deviation decrease of the average beliefs towards Gender Equality.
Similar slight readjustments take place on the other three variables measuring Gender Equality.
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Specifically, the effect on the belief towards female labour participation (JSC) is now significant
on the 5% level, while the effect on the belief towards female political participation is significant
on the 1% level. Finally, the effect on the belief towards higher education attainment (UIG), is
now significant at the 5% level, while maintaining a similar magnitude to prior specifications.
Thus, the inclusion of colonial origins as an additional control, has a mixed effect on the results
on different variables measuring beliefs about Gender Equality, but the baseline measurement
(Y022), remains negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.
Column (6) and (7) add the same controls used in the baseline model’s columns (3) and (4),
i.e. GDP and historical Plough agricultural usage. The effect of Land Gini on average beliefs
towards Gender Equality (first line) remain almost identical to the previous column, at least
for the inclusion of GDP per capita in column (6). The only exception is the effect of Land Gini
on the belief towards female labour participation (JSC), which is now statistically significant
only on the 10% level. The effect on the other two beliefs (WPL and UIG), remain statistically
significant on the 5% level. However, the inclusion of historical Plough usage in agriculture
(column 7), has a more pronounced impact on the results. Now the effect of Land Gini on
the average beliefs towards Gender Equality is still negative and statistically significant, but
only on the 5% level. The magnitude of the effect is decreased as well, since now am increase
of one standard deviation of Land Gini leads to a 0.36 standard deviation decrease in average
belief towards Gender Equality. Moreover, the effect of Land Gini on the other beliefs towards
gender equality are weakened as well. The effect of Land Gini on the belief towards female
labour participation now becomes statistically not significant (albeit with a t-value very close
to the 10% level). The effect on the other two variables (WPL and UIG), remains statistically
significant on the 5% level, though the magnitude of the effect is decreased. Overall, the
inclusion of historical Plough agriculture has a bigger effect in the full controls specification,
but the main result still hold, even though only on the 5% level.
To sum up, the effect of Land Gini on the beliefs towards Gender Equality is negative and
statistically significant, even after including controls such as Religious Fractionalization, Legal
and Colonial origins. The next section proceeds to investigate whether these macro effects can
be found on sample of individuals, i.e. as microeconomic effects.
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6 Empirical Analysis - Individual Level
6.1 World Values Survey - Empirical Strategy
I now take a complimentary approach, investigating whether the macroeconomic effects that
were analyzed in the previous section can be traced in individual level beliefs towards Gender
Equality. The same hypothesis, that Land Gini has an effect on the beliefs towards Gender
Equality, is reexamined, only now the analysis will not just include country controls, but add
individual level controls, such as age, gender, and education.
For this section, I utilize the same dataset from the previous section (World Values Survey
Longditutional Dataset, 1999-2014), only now the individual beliefs are not averaged in order
to be compared with country scores, rather the average score of each country is assigned to
every individual as an additional control. The analysis takes place with 119.309 individuals
from the 55 countries of the baseline sample reported in section 5.2. The empirical specification
is given by the following equation:
Beliefijt = β1Vollrath Ginii + β2Plowi + β3GDPi + β4Xi + β5Zijt + ǫijt (2)
where, like before, Beliefijt is one of the four measurements of Gender Equality taken from
the World Values Survey (i.e. Belief in Gender Equality, Belief towards female labour force
participation, higher education attendance, political participation), only now for an individual
j from country i, for the period t between 1999-2014 13. V ollrath Ginii is the Gini coeffiecient
measuring Land ownership concentration in country i but is now assigned to every individual
j from that country. Data for this variable is again taken from Vollrath and Erickson (2007),
with only the earliest value of each country’s Land Gini being used, and for the majority of
individuals (from the 55 countries) the Gini coefficient is from the 1960s and 1970s. The two
main controls from before are matched for each individual j in the same way, thus Plowi is
the average historical usage in the country i assigned to every individual j from that country,
and GDPi is the relevant GDP per capita, matched to every individual j from country i. Xi
is a vector of continental and geographic controls, similar to the ones in the previous section
(continental fixed effects, latitude, longtitude, landlocked). Zijt is a set of individual level
controls that are established in relevant literature (Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Luttmer and
Singhal, 2011). Specifically, the controls include age, age squared, gender, highest education,
13It should be noted that the time subscription is not entirely accurate, given the fact that these are not the
observations of the same individuals over this period. Rather, they are repeated cross-section datasets, from
the same countries.
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employment status, and current income. All the specifications have been weighted using the
original weights provided from the WVS database. Like before, a negative sign of the coefficient
β1 is expected, indicating that for higher values of historical Land Inequality (in the 1960s and
70s), individuals j have lower average contemporary beliefs in favor of Gender Equality.
6.2 World Values Survey - Results
Table 7 summarizes the results from the individual level analysis. The format is the same
as in the baseline results from section 5.2. The first line reports the effect of Land Gini on the
individual’s belief in favour of Gender Equality. The second, third and fourth lines report the
effect of Land Gini on the individuals’ belief towards female labour participation (JSC), female
political participation (WPL), and female higher education attendance (UIG), respectively14.
Column (1) includes both the individual level controls (age, age squared, gender, education,
employment, and income), along the country continental fixed effects. The effect of Land
Gini on the beliefs of the individual in favour of Gender Equality is negative, and statistically
significant on the 1% level, in accordance with the findings from the macro analysis. However,
the effect seems to be mainly driven by the last belief (UIG). Specifically, only the effect of Land
Gini on the belief towards female higher education attendance (UIG) remains both negative
and statistically significant at the 1% level. The effect of Land Gini on the belief towards female
political participation (WPL) is negative, but not statistically significant, and the same holds
for the effect of Land Gini on the belief towards female labour participation (JSC), which again
is negative and not statistically significant (even though very close to the 10% level).
The rest of the columns (2-4) add the controls in the same way as in the baseline results, i.e.
column (2) Geographical, column (3) GDP per capita and column (4) historical plough usage
in agriculture. For each specification the individual controls are always included. Focusing
on the final column (4), one can observe that the effect of Land Gini on belief in favour of
Gender Equality remains negative and statistically significant in the 5% level. Similar to the
first column, the effect is driven by the two last beliefs. Specifically, the effect of Land Gini
on the belief towards female higher education attendance (UIG) and the belief towards female
political participation (WPL) is negative and statistically significant on the 5% and 10% level
respectively, while the effect of Land Gini on the beliefs towards female labour participation is
negative but not statistically significant (even though once again it is close to the 10% level).
14Regressions with all variables are reported in the appendix, Tables A14, A15, A16, and A17,
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Table 7: OLS Estimates of Land Inequality on Beliefs about Gender Equality - WVS
(Micro Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continental Geographical GDP All Controls
Equality (Y022)
Vollrath Gini -0.358*** -0.385** -0.396*** -0.324**
(-3.12) (-2.61) (-2.68) (-2.06)
Adjusted R2 0.299 0.307 0.307 0.310
JSC (C001)
Vollrath Gini -1.203 -1.611 -1.495 -1.045
(-1.40) (-1.31) (-1.34) (-1.33)
Adjusted R2 0.077 0.079 0.082 0.096
WPL (D059)
Vollrath Gini -0.874 -1.145* -1.289** -1.208*
(-1.66) (-1.83) (-2.06) (-1.78)
Adjusted R2 0.139 0.144 0.146 0.146
UIG (D060)
Vollrath Gini -0.777** -1.099*** -1.098** -0.894**
(-2.57) (-2.70) (-2.68) (-2.19)
Adjusted R2 0.098 0.099 0.099 0.101
Observations 119309 119309 119309 119309
Individual Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continetal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical No Yes Yes Yes
GDP/capita No No Yes Yes
P loughAgriculture No No No Yes
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Land Gini is a ratio measuring
the Inequality in Land ownership taking into account Landlessness, and the variable is from Vollrath
and Erickson (2007). Originally taken from FAO database (Food and Agricultural Organization of the
United Nations), and measures Land Holdings by size in acres. Y022 is the Gender Equality Index,
a combined scale from the World Values Survey (Longitudinal data from 1999 to 2014), consisting
of the following three variables: JSC (C001) ”When jobs are scarce, men should have more right
to a job than women” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). WPL (D059) ”On
the whole, men make better political leaders than women do” (agreement coded low - higher values
indicate equality). UIG (D060) ”A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl”
(agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). GDP is measured in log GDP per capita,
ppp (constant 2011 international U.S. Dollars) and is taken from Quality of Governence Database
(2018). Plough measures the degree of historical Plough usage, and is taken from Alesina, Giuliano
and Nunn (2013). All specifications include Individual controls, such as age, age squared, gender,
highest education, employment status, income, and are weighted using the original weights provided
from the WVS database.
6.3 2nd Generation Immigrants - European Social Survey
Certain issues exist with the methodology and results outlined in sections 6.1 and 6.2. To
begin with, there is the problem that since the data are pseudo-panel (i.e. not same individuals
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in all waves), it is hard to argue that the effect of Land Gini on beliefs in favour of Gender
Equality is captured successfully. The main reason is that the dependent variable (beliefs)
changes over time - albeit slowly - due to other unobservable factors (e.g. institutions). Fur-
thermore, the time period (1999 to 2014), is approximately 15 years15, making comparisons
between individuals from different generations even harder. Focusing on a different sample, as
well as methodology, could provide a reasonable alternative.
There is a strand of literature trying to establish economic effects on cultural norms, by
focusing on immigrants. The main reason for using samples of immigrants in order to under-
stand how cultural norms are affected by economic parameters is due to the fact that it’s an
easier way to capture the differences clearly. Whether it is for investigating how the fertility
rates affect beliefs of second generation women in the U.S. (Fernández and Fogli, 2009), or how
redistribution levels in the home country affect the beliefs towards redistribution and political
behavior of second generation immigrants (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011), the use of second gen-
eration immigrants allows a better disentaglement of what can be attributed on the persistance
and trasmission cultural norms. The approach I follow is similar with Michalopoulos (2012),
and closer to Litina (2016), where she uses the land suitability of the country of origin, to
show its effect on the trust levels of immigrants. My approach is focused solely on the second
generation of immigrants, in order to bypass issues of selective migration that may influence
the decision for the country of destination.
Since the longitudinal dataset from WVS does not provide enough information for this
exercise, I turn on data from the European Social Survey (ESS, 2016). Unfortunately, only
one of the questions measuring beliefs towards Gender Equality has been asked in this survey,
and it is identitical to the question from the World Values Survey regarding female labour
participation. Specifically, the question asked was: ”When jobs are scarce, men should have
more right to a job than women.”, which I already have coded earlier as JSC. Once again,
higher values of this variable indicate positive view towards Gender Equality. By combining
this dataset with the information on the historical Land Inequality, I try to establish the effect
of Land Gini on contemporary beliefs towards female labour participation in the next section.
6.4 2nd Generation Immigrants - Empirical Methodology
The data on second generation immigrants comes from the 8th wave of the European Social
Survey, and took place in 2016, across 23 European countries. My interest lies on the country
15Regressions including additional waves are reported in Table A18
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of origin of the parents, for those who were born in the current country of residence (and can be
considered natives). In other words, I focus only on second generation immigrants, and analyze
how the historical Land Inequality in the country of origin of their parents may have affected
their beliefs towards female labour participation.
Ideally, it would be preferable to use a measure that went further back in time, i.e. before the
1950s, since that would be closely related to the relevant literature. The land gini measurements
utilized are primarily from the 1960s and 1970s, while the data for beliefs of individuals are
from 2016. The main concern is whether the ancestors of the second generation immigrants
resided in their respective country of origin during that period. Since the survey only includes
adults, even the youngest respondent was born prior to 2000. Land inequality is a slowly
changing variable, and the correlation between values from the 1960s and 1970s, going into
the 1990s is very high (above 0.8). The same applies for periods earlier than the 1960s, as
correlations for either one of the alternative measurements (Frankema Gini or Family Farms)
between measurements from 1960s and prior to 1950 are high as well (around 0.8). Hence,
even in extreme cases such as parents moving into the country in the early 1950s (i.e. second
generation immigrants older than or around 65 years old), the land inequality in their country
of origin was not substantially different than the measurement from the 1960s and 1970s.
Similarly, second generation immigrants born in late 1990s, had parents that were likely
born in the their country of origin during the 1970s. Anecdotally, the author himself happens
to be a second generation immigrant (even though not currently residing in either country of
origin or country of birth), whose parents were born during the 1960s in their country of origin,
before moving to a different country during the 1980s. Overall, in both cases (very young or
very old respondents), I argue that parents of second generation immigrants likely resided in
their respective country of origin during a period with similar characteristics (regarding land
inequality) with the measurements from the 1960s and 1970s.
I split the sample of second generation immigrants to three different but overlapping samples.
Those who only their mother is a first generation immigrant, only father immigrant, and either
one of their parents is a first generation immigrant. The reason for this is to distinguish
whether there is a difference, in accordance to findings from relevant literature [ Fernández and
Fogli (2009); Luttmer and Singhal (2011) etc.] showing that such transmission effects usually
can be attributed to the mother’s side. Unsurprisingly, the sample of either parents being an
immigrant is larger, and consists of 2075 individuals. The other two samples are smaler, and
consist of 1312 individuals for the father’s effect, and 1299 for the mother’s effect. Information
on countries of birth and ancestral origin, as well as the percentages of each in the relevant
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samples, are reported in the appendix (Table A19).
The empirical specification analyzing the impact of historical land inequality on the con-
temporary beliefs of second generation immigrants, is given from the following equation:
Beliefij = β1Vollrath Ginii + β2Plowi + β3GDPi + β4Xk + β5Zij + ǫij (3)
where Beliefij is the belief towards female labour force participation (JSC), for an second
generation immigrant individual j, from parent’s country of origin i. V ollrath Ginii is the
Gini coefficient measuring Land ownership concentration in country of ancestral origin i and
is assigned to every individual j depending on the country of origin of the parent. Data for
this variable is taken from Vollrath and Erickson (2007), with only the earliest value of each
country’s Land Gini is used (from the 1960s and 1970s).
The two main controls from the country-level analysis are matched for each individual j
in the same way, thus Plowi is the average historical usage in the country of origin i of the
parent and assigned to every individual j responding to the survey. GDPi is the relevant
GDP per capita, matched to every individual j again according to the ancestral country of
origin i. Xk is a vector of country fixed effects for country of residence k. Zij is a set of
individual level controls and include age, age squared, gender, highest education, employment
status, religion and current income. All the specifications have been weighted using the original
weights provided from the ESS database, and the standard errors are clustered at the respective
country of origin level. Like before, a negative sign of the coefficient β1 is expected, indicating
that for higher values of historical Land Inequality in the parental country of origin (in the
1960s and 70s), individuals j have lower contemporary beliefs in favor of Gender Equality.
6.5 2nd Generation Immigrants - Results
The results for the 2nd Generation Immigrants for the European Social Survey are reported
at Table 8. The only belief regarding Gender Equality is towards the female labour participa-
tion, JSC, which is identical to the one previously used in the World Values Survey sample.
Three subsamples are reported, on different lines. Specifically, the first line reports the results
for the sample of 2nd Generation immigrants that have either a father or mother who was a
1st Generation immigrant, but were born in the country of current residence (where the sur-
vey took place). The second line reports just the effect of the father’s country of origin, on
a subsample of the 2nd Generation immigrants. Similarly, the third line reports the effect of
Land Gini in the country of mother’s side, on the beliefs towards female labour participation
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of 2nd Generation immigrants. While overlapping, these samples are not the summary of each
others, since it is possible that a second generation immigrant may only have one immigrant
parent. However, in order to distinguish the effects between the ancestral country of origin,
this sampling took place.
Column (1) is the baseline specification, and includes only country fixed effects. The effect
of historical Land Gini in the ancestral country of origin appears to have a negative and sta-
tistically significant effect on contemporary beliefs towards female labour participation. While
the effect is negative and statistically significant for all specifications, it is only significant on
the 10% level for the first and second line (effect of either parents being an immigrant, or father
only being an immigrant), while it is strognly significant (1% level) for the effect of Land Gini in
the mother’s country of origin, on second generation immigrant’s beliefs towards female labour
participation. Hence, in line with results from the cross-country sample, individuals that are
descended by mothers from countries experiencing higher levels of land inequality in the early
1960s and 1970s are less likely to be in favour of female labour participation, all else being
equal.
Column (2) begins adding relevant controls to the baseline specification. For this column,
personal characteristics such as age, age squared and gender are added as controls. The effect
of land gini in the ancestral country remains similar across the different lines, with the only
difference being a slight increase for father’s efffect, which now is negative and statistically
significant on the 5% level (instead of 10%). However the effect of having either one parent
being a first generation immigrant remains negative but only statistically significant on the
10% level, while the efffect of land gini in the mother’s country of origin has a negative and
statistically significant effect (on the 1% level) on the beliefs towards female labour market
participation.
Column (3) adds various questions regarding religion in all the specifications. Specifically,
the questions asked are the following three: ”How religious are you?” ”How often do you
attend religious services apart from special occasions?” ”How often do you pray apart from at
religious services?”. As with the cross-country sample, measuring the importance of religion
attributes towards a cultural norm is imporant, in order to be certain that such choices are not
affected by these factors. It is in this specification that the effect of either parents becomes
insignificant, while remaining negative and close to the 10% level. Reassuringly, the other
two lines have similar results, namely the effect from the father’s side is still negative and
statistically significant on the 5% level, while the effect of land gini from the mother’s country
of origin has a negative and statistically significant effect (at 1% level) on the beliefs towards
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Table 8: OLS Estimates of Land Inequality on Gender Equality Belief: When Jobs Scarce,
Right to Work (C001) - ESS Sample (2nd Generation Immigrants)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Baseline Personal Religion Education Income GDP All Controls
Either Parent Sample
p Vollrath Gini -1.071* -1.061* -0.913 -0.849 -0.830 -1.287 -1.307
(-1.73) (-1.71) (-1.50) (-1.54) (-1.40) (-1.63) (-1.65)
Observations 2075 2075 2075 2075 1747 1747 1747
Adjusted R2 0.097 0.101 0.137 0.172 0.175 0.175 0.175
Father’s Origin Sample
fs Vollrath Gini -0.952* -1.053** -0.912** -0.846** -0.765 0.281 0.207
(-1.82) (-2.05) (-2.15) (-2.15) (-1.40) (0.39) (0.28)
Observations 1312 1312 1312 1312 1097 1097 1097
Adjusted R2 0.100 0.108 0.144 0.176 0.183 0.183 0.183
Mother’s Origin Sample
ms Vollrath Gini -2.377*** -2.340*** -2.122*** -1.972*** -2.365*** -2.365*** -2.420***
(-3.53) (-3.47) (-3.50) (-3.52) (-4.04) (-4.92) (-5.05)
Observations 1299 1299 1299 1299 1082 1082 1082
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.101 0.160 0.184 0.189 0.188 0.188
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income No No No No Yes Yes Yes
GDP/capita No No No No No Yes Yes
P loughAgriculture No No No No No No Yes
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Land Gini is a ratio measuring
the Inequality in Land ownership taking into account Landlessness, and the variable is from Vollrath
and Erickson (2007). Originally taken from FAO database (Food and Agricultural Organization of the
United Nations), and measures Land Holdings by size in acres. The dependent variable is taken from
the European Social Survey (Wave 8), and matches the WVS question measuring Gender Equality:
C001 ”When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” (agreement coded
low - higher values indicate equality). There are three subsamples, depending on the respondents:
p Vollrath Gini captures the average Land Gini of the two parents birth country, in case either of
them is an immigrant. The other two variables (fs Vollrath Gini and ms Vollrath Gini) capture the
average Land Gini on the Birth Country of Father and Mother respectively (i.e. only Father’s/Mother’s
effect). GDP is measured in log GDP per capita, ppp (constant 2011 international U.S. Dollars) and is
taken from Quality of Governence Database (2018). Plough measures the degree of historical Plough
usage, and is taken from Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013). Religious controls include answers to
the following questions: ”How religious are you?” ”How often do you attend religious services apart
from special occasions?” ”How often do you pray apart from at religious services?”. Other individual
controls include age, gender, highest education, employment status, income, and are weighted using
the original weights provided from the ESS database.
female labour participation.
Column (4) adds higher education as a control variable to the regressions. The effects
remain similar with the previous column even though they have lower t-values than before.
Once again, the effect of land gini of the mother’s country of origin on beliefs towards female
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labour partcipation is negative and statistically significant on the 1% level, while the effect
from the father’s land gini is negative and statistically significant on the 5% level. The effect
of having either one parent being a first generation immigrant is negative but not signifcant.
Column (5) adds self reported level of income as a control variable. Unfortunately this
variable isn’t available across all countries, leading to a decline in the number of participants
by roughly 300 (depending on the sample). Furthermore, the inclusion of self-reported income
changes the effect from the father’s country of origin, making it not statistically significant.
Like before, the effect from having either parent as a first generation immigrant is negative but
not significant as well. The only effect that remains negative and statistically significant on the
1% level is from the mother’s country of origin. Interestingly, the effect becomes even stronger
(increased t-values), which is probably due to the change of sample size. Overall, after adding
all individual controls, the only effect that seems to be signifcant is that of the land gini on the
mother’s country during the 1960s and 1970s on the beliefs towards female labour participation
(in 2016).
Column (6) adds the average GDP in the country of respective origin as a control. Regarding
the fist line, i.e. whether an individual has either one immigrant parent, the GDP from the
mother’s country is matched as a control. The effect of land gini on the beliefs towards female
labour participation remain negative and not statistically significant, for the first line (either
parent immigrant). A somewhat different effect is now reported in the second line (effect from
the father’s country of origin). The coefficient actually turns positive, but is quite far away
from being statistically significant. However, the effect of land gini from the mother’s country
of origin on the beliefs towards female labour participation remains negative and strongly
statistically significant on the 1% level.
Finally, column (7) adds the presence of historical plough agriculture as a control variable.
The results are almost identical to the previous column. Specifically, the only effect that remains
negative and statistically significant (at 1% level) is that of the land gini in the mother’s country
of origin. In other words, for higher levels of land inequality in the mother’s country of origin
(during the 1960s and 1970s), there is a negative effect on the contemporary beliefs towards
female labour participation of second generation immigrants born and raised in one of the
country in the ESS sample.
To sum up, this section analyzed the impact that Land Inequality in the ancestral country of
origin has in contemporary beliefs of second generation immigrants. While in the beginning it
appeared that either side of the parents influence the development of this specific belief, adding
a series of personal and ancestral country controls showcased that the effect is primarily driven
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by the mother’s country of origin. This finding is in line with relevant literature (Luttmer and
Singhal, 2011), that cultural transmission through generations is dominated by the mother’s
side of the effect.
7 Conclusion
The determinants of cultural norms are still a relatively new interest to economists. Beliefs
towards Gender Equality are increasingly receiving more attention in both the public sphere
and research. In this study I tried to add to this growing literature by examining one factor
that has shaped societies, namely the distribution of land holdings in each country. I show that
on average, countries that have experienced higher levels of land inequality in the past, are less
likely to be characterized by favourable views towards Gender Equality. In other words, land
inequality in the past, had a negative effect to contemporary beliefs in favour of Gender Equality,
such as views regarding female labour participation, higher education attendance and political
participation. Using a measurement of terrain ruggedness (average slope of each country) as
an instrument I tried to show that this relationship is more than a simple correlation. To
further strengthen the baseline results, I showed that similar effects can be found when similar
measurements of land inequality are utilized.
Moving beyond cross-country comparisons, the effect of land inequality can be traced to
individuals as well. Using individual level data from the latest wave of the European Values
Survey, I have shown that historical land inequality may have been a determinant factor shaping
beliefs of second generation immigrants. The effect appears to be driven by the mother’s country
of origin, in line with relevant literature on cultural transmission.
In conclusion, the importance of historical economic factors in determining cultural norms,
is a promising field of research. While it’s undeniable that culture is shaped by various social
and anthropological circumstances, the role of history and past economic realities should be
highlighted, in order to understand the role of culture in economics.
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A Appendix
Table A1: Definition of variables from World Values Survey
C001 - When Jobs are
scarce (JSC)
The exact wording of the question is as follows: “When jobs are scarce, men should have
more right to a job than women.” The original coding in the WVS database, has three
answers. For agreeing, the response is coded as 1, disagreeing is coded as 2, and for neither
agreeing nor disagreeing the response is coded as 3. Following the logic used to create the
equality sub-index, this variable is re-coded in order to make the three main variables similar.
Questions for which an respondent agrees with the statement, are re-coded as 0. Questions for
which an respondent disagrees, are re-coded as 1. Finally, questions for which an respondent
neither agrees nor disagrees, are re-coded as 0.5. Higher values indicate beliefs in favour of
gender equality.
D059 - Women as Po-
litical Leaders (WPL)
The exact wording of the question is as follows: “On the whole, men make better political
leaders than women do.” The original coding in the WVS database, has four answers. When
a respondent strongly agrees with the statement, the response is coded as 1, if the respondent
only agrees it is coded as 2. When a respondent strongly disagrees with the statement is
coded as 4, while disagreement is coded as 3, and no answer is coded as -1. Following a
similar process with variable C001, this variable is re-coded in order to measure whether a
response is in favour of gender equality. Higher values indicate beliefs in favour of gender
equality.
D060 - University is
Important for a Girl
(UIG)
The exact wording of the question is as follows: “A university education is more important
for a boy than for a girl.” The original coding in the WVS database, has four answers, and
is identical to variable (D059). When a respondent strongly agrees with the statement, the
response is coded as 1, if the respondent only agrees it is coded as 2. When a respondent
strongly disagrees with the statement is coded as 4, while disagreement is coded as 3, and
no answer is coded as -1. Following a similar process with variable C001, this variable is re-
coded in order to measure whether a response is in favour of gender equality. Higher values
indicate beliefs in favour of gender equality.
Note: notes here.
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Table A2: Correlations between















∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A3: Correlations between Waves over time -
main variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)


















N 99 99 99 99
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A4: Correlations between Waves over time -
waves 4 to 6
(1) (2) (3) (4)





























N 99 99 99 99
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A5: OLS Estimates of Land Inequality on Beliefs about Gender Equality - Macro Sample - All variables - Y022
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continental Geographical GDP All Controls
Equality (Y022)
Vollrath Gini -0.564*** -0.533*** -0.536*** -0.511***
(-5.86) (-4.45) (-4.44) (-4.05)
Africa dummy -0.229*** -0.0818 -0.0980 -0.120
(-3.50) (-0.86) (-1.09) (-1.39)
Europe dummy -0.0596** 0.116 0.110 0.0871
(-2.45) (1.60) (1.57) (1.26)
Asia dummy -0.310*** -0.212*** -0.223*** -0.250***
(-16.01) (-4.88) (-4.69) (-5.02)
Oceania dummy 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Americas dummy -0.0394*** 0.172* 0.163* 0.150
(-2.97) (1.71) (1.69) (1.62)
Dummy for Landlocked countries -0.0426 -0.0460 -0.0482
(-1.29) (-1.24) (-1.30)
Latitude -0.000612 -0.000547 -0.000730
(-0.90) (-0.76) (-0.95)
Longitude 0.000799 0.000792 0.000775
(1.63) (1.62) (1.63)
Log GDP per capita -0.00635 -0.00968
(-0.31) (-0.48)
Usage of Plough Agriculture 0.0390
(1.20)
Constant 1.217*** 1.047*** 1.119*** 1.129***
(14.42) (7.09) (4.33) (4.36)
Adjusted R2 0.743 0.764 0.760 0.760
Observations 55 55 55 55
Continetal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical No Yes Yes Yes
GDP/capita No No Yes Yes
PloughAgriculture No No No Yes
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Land Gini is a ratio measuring the Inequality in Land ownership taking
into account Landlessness, and the variable is from Vollrath and Erickson (2007). Originally taken from FAO database (Food and Agricultural
Organization of the United Nations), and measures Land Holdings by size in acres. Y022 is the Gender Equality Index, a combined scale
from the World Values Survey, consisting of the following three variables: JSC (C001) “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right
to a job than women” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). WPL (D059) “On the whole, men make better political
leaders than women do” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). UIG (D060) “A university education is more important
for a boy than for a girl” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). GDP is measured in log GDP per capita, ppp (constant
2011 international U.S. Dollars) and is taken from Quality of Governence Database (2018). Plough measures the degree of historical Plough
usage, and is taken from Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013).
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Table A6: OLS Estimates of Land Inequality on Beliefs about Gender Equality - Macro Sample - All variables - C001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continental Geographical GDP All Controls
JSC (C001)
Vollrath Gini -0.682*** -0.606*** -0.613*** -0.582***
(-4.72) (-3.08) (-3.13) (-2.90)
Africa dummy -0.330*** -0.154 -0.196 -0.223
(-3.34) (-1.02) (-1.37) (-1.65)
Europe dummy -0.127*** 0.0740 0.0577 0.0293
(-3.84) (0.65) (0.52) (0.26)
Asia dummy -0.458*** -0.353*** -0.381*** -0.414***
(-16.93) (-5.23) (-5.11) (-5.13)
Oceania dummy 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Americas dummy -0.0911*** 0.166 0.142 0.126
(-3.44) (1.07) (0.95) (0.86)
Dummy for Landlocked countries -0.0595 -0.0683 -0.0711
(-1.22) (-1.22) (-1.27)
Latitude -0.000419 -0.000249 -0.000475
(-0.36) (-0.21) (-0.37)
Longitude 0.00103 0.00102 0.000995
(1.35) (1.32) (1.32)
Log GDP per capita -0.0165 -0.0206
(-0.50) (-0.62)
Usage of Plough Agriculture 0.0481
(0.86)
Constant 1.377*** 1.138*** 1.327*** 1.338***
(10.92) (4.79) (3.15) (3.13)
Adjusted R2 0.658 0.664 0.659 0.656
Observations 55 55 55 55
Continetal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical No Yes Yes Yes
GDP/capita No No Yes Yes
PloughAgriculture No No No Yes
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Land Gini is a ratio measuring the Inequality in Land ownership
taking into account Landlessness, and the variable is from Vollrath and Erickson (2007). Originally taken from FAO database (Food and
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations), and measures Land Holdings by size in acres. JSC (C001) “When jobs are scarce,
men should have more right to a job than women” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). GDP is measured in log GDP
per capita, ppp (constant 2011 international U.S. Dollars) and is taken from Quality of Governence Database (2018). Plough measures
the degree of historical Plough usage, and is taken from Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013).
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Table A7: OLS Estimates of Land Inequality on Beliefs about Gender Equality - Macro Sample - All variables - D059
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continental Geographical GDP All Controls
WPL (D059)
Vollrath Gini -0.594*** -0.567*** -0.573*** -0.564***
(-5.47) (-4.52) (-4.44) (-4.17)
Africa dummy -0.260*** -0.0594 -0.0913 -0.0992
(-3.97) (-0.61) (-0.96) (-1.06)
Europe dummy -0.0453* 0.197** 0.185** 0.177**
(-1.69) (2.61) (2.49) (2.26)
Asia dummy -0.284*** -0.147*** -0.168*** -0.178***
(-12.61) (-3.31) (-3.47) (-3.20)
Oceania dummy 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Americas dummy -0.0152 0.274** 0.256** 0.251**
(-1.11) (2.53) (2.32) (2.26)
Dummy for Landlocked countries -0.0507 -0.0574 -0.0582
(-1.40) (-1.36) (-1.37)
Latitude -0.000929 -0.000800 -0.000866
(-1.34) (-1.09) (-1.22)
Longitude 0.00107** 0.00106* 0.00105*
(2.09) (2.00) (1.97)
Log GDP per capita -0.0125 -0.0137
(-0.66) (-0.70)
Usage of Plough Agriculture 0.0140
(0.47)
Constant 1.164*** 0.945*** 1.089*** 1.092***
(12.26) (6.29) (4.18) (4.12)
Adjusted R2 0.721 0.769 0.767 0.762
Observations 55 55 55 55
Continetal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical No Yes Yes Yes
GDP/capita No No Yes Yes
PloughAgriculture No No No Yes
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Land Gini is a ratio measuring the Inequality in Land ownership
taking into account Landlessness, and the variable is from Vollrath and Erickson (2007). Originally taken from FAO database (Food and
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations), and measures Land Holdings by size in acres. WPL (D059) “On the whole, men make
better political leaders than women do” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). GDP is measured in log GDP per capita,
ppp (constant 2011 international U.S. Dollars) and is taken from Quality of Governence Database (2018). Plough measures the degree of
historical Plough usage, and is taken from Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013).
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Table A8: OLS Estimates of Land Inequality on Beliefs about Gender Equality - Macro Sample - All variables - D060
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continental Geographical GDP All Controls
UIG (D060)
Vollrath Gini -0.486*** -0.484*** -0.481*** -0.443***
(-4.59) (-3.66) (-3.55) (-3.25)
Africa dummy -0.114** -0.0551 -0.0387 -0.0714
(-2.58) (-0.91) (-0.65) (-1.14)
Europe dummy -0.0334 0.0414 0.0478 0.0134
(-1.29) (0.68) (0.80) (0.25)
Asia dummy -0.197*** -0.153*** -0.142*** -0.182***
(-9.97) (-4.35) (-3.49) (-4.41)
Oceania dummy 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Americas dummy -0.0172 0.0563 0.0657 0.0467
(-1.10) (0.61) (0.73) (0.58)
Dummy for Landlocked countries -0.0267 -0.0233 -0.0266
(-0.81) (-0.71) (-0.82)
Latitude -0.000430 -0.000496 -0.000769
(-0.83) (-0.89) (-1.19)
Longitude 0.000232 0.000240 0.000214
(0.52) (0.53) (0.53)
Log GDP per capita 0.00643 0.00147
(0.39) (0.09)
Usage of Plough Agriculture 0.0580
(1.61)
Constant 1.177*** 1.125*** 1.051*** 1.065***
(12.65) (7.67) (4.48) (4.84)
Adjusted R2 0.664 0.659 0.653 0.671
Observations 55 55 55 55
Continetal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical No Yes Yes Yes
GDP/capita No No Yes Yes
PloughAgriculture No No No Yes
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Land Gini is a ratio measuring the Inequality in Land ownership
taking into account Landlessness, and the variable is from Vollrath and Erickson (2007). Originally taken from FAO database (Food and
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations), and measures Land Holdings by size in acres. UIG (D060) “A university education
is more important for a boy than for a girl” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). GDP is measured in log GDP per
capita, ppp (constant 2011 international U.S. Dollars) and is taken from Quality of Governence Database (2018). Plough measures the
degree of historical Plough usage, and is taken from Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013).
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Table A9: IV Estimates of Land Inequality on Gender Equality - Instrument is ruggedness - Extended Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Continental Geographical Religion Fractional Colonial GDP All Controls
Equality (Y022)
Vollrath Gini -0.820*** -0.902*** -0.525*** -0.508*** -0.466*** -0.502*** -0.452***
(-2.613) (-2.979) (-2.628) (-2.591) (-2.905) (-2.969) (-2.777)
R2 0.210 0.295 0.656 0.692 0.736 0.767 0.786
JSC (C001)
Vollrath Gini -0.684 -0.817* -0.220 -0.172 -0.091 -0.152 -0.075
(-1.349) (-1.770) (-0.790) (-0.619) (-0.371) (-0.616) (-0.286)
R2 0.170 0.223 0.573 0.611 0.644 0.690 0.702
WPL (D059)
Vollrath Gini -1.055*** -1.149*** -0.838*** -0.849*** -0.750*** -0.791*** -0.786***
(-3.240) (-3.771) (-3.257) (-3.275) (-4.352) (-4.368) (-4.105)
R2 0.102 0.265 0.596 0.593 0.722 0.755 0.756
UIG (D060)
Vollrath Gini -0.766*** -0.796*** -0.568*** -0.556*** -0.599*** -0.607*** -0.543***
(-2.640) (-2.870) (-2.599) (-2.621) (-2.767) (-2.770) (-2.633)
R2 0.190 0.244 0.444 0.499 0.500 0.501 0.555
Continetal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fractionalization No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
ColonialOrigins No No No No Yes Yes Yes
GDP No No No No No Yes Yes
PloughAgriculture No No No No No No Yes
First stage estimates Vollrath Gini
nunn rugged slope -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012***
(-2.784) (-3.617) (-4.243) (-3.936) (-3.514) (-3.496) (-3.359)
First stage F-stat 7.753 13.080 18.002 15.492 12.350 12.221 11.284
Underidentification test 0.027 0.027 0.010 0.018 0.014 0.012 0.012
Observations 55 55 54 53 53 53 53
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The underidentification test reports the p-value of the Kleibergen-Paap rk
LM statistic. Terrain Rugged Slope is a measure of terrain ruggedness (average slope, %) for each country, and is taken from Nunn (2012). Land
Gini is a ratio measuring the Inequality in Land ownership taking into account Landlessness, and the variable is from Vollrath and Erickson
(2007). Originally taken from FAO database (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations), and measures Land Holdings by size
in acres. Y022 is the Gender Equality Index, a combined scale from the World Values Survey, consisting of the following three variables: JSC
(C001) ”When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality).
WPL (D059) ”On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality).
UIG (D060) ”A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality).
Fractionalization measures the amount of ethnic, religious and linguistic homogeneity in a country, and is taken from Alesina (2001). Legal
origins is an indicator, taking different values with respect to the legal tradition that influenced a given country (e.g. British, French, Socialist
etc.) and is taken from Nunn (2012). Colonial origins is an indicator, taking different values with respect to the country that may had colonized
a given country (e.g. Spanish, British etc.) and is taken from Acemoglu (2001). GDP is measured in log GDP per capita, ppp (constant 2011
international U.S. Dollars) and is taken from Quality of Governence Database (2018). Plough measures the degree of historical Plough usage,
and is taken from Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013).
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Table A10: OLS Estimates of Land Inequality on Beliefs about Gender Equality - More Controls - All variables - Y022
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Continental Geographical Fractional Legal Colonial GDP All Controls
Equality (Y022)
Vollrath Gini -0.564*** -0.533*** -0.539*** -0.409*** -0.463*** -0.437*** -0.363**
(-5.86) (-4.45) (-4.72) (-2.79) (-2.89) (-2.78) (-2.49)
Africa dummy -0.229*** -0.0818 -0.211*** -0.221*** -0.180** -0.177** -0.196***
(-3.50) (-0.86) (-3.80) (-3.49) (-2.11) (-2.36) (-3.03)
Europe dummy -0.0596** 0.116 -0.0142 -0.0318 -0.0374 0.0122 -0.0141
(-2.45) (1.60) (-0.28) (-0.55) (-0.54) (0.18) (-0.23)
Asia dummy -0.310*** -0.212*** -0.320*** -0.328*** -0.281** -0.234** -0.256***
(-16.01) (-4.88) (-4.16) (-3.68) (-2.64) (-2.36) (-3.00)
Oceania dummy 0 0 -0.165 -0.184 -0.126 -0.0232 0.00270
(.) (.) (-1.62) (-1.48) (-0.88) (-0.17) (0.02)
Americas dummy -0.0394*** 0.172* 0 0 0 0 0
(-2.97) (1.71) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Dummy for Landlocked -0.0426 -0.0667* -0.0533 -0.0494 -0.0750 -0.0562
(-1.29) (-1.81) (-1.22) (-1.11) (-1.59) (-1.18)
Latitude -0.000612 -0.000907* -0.000797 -0.000781 -0.000683 -0.000937
(-0.90) (-1.72) (-1.40) (-1.22) (-1.09) (-1.15)
Longitude 0.000799 0.000483 0.000600 0.000442 0.0000774 0.0000551
(1.63) (1.07) (1.10) (0.69) (0.13) (0.11)
Religious fragmentation 0.133*** 0.171*** 0.218*** 0.244*** 0.237***
(3.10) (2.86) (4.28) (4.68) (4.99)
French civil law 0.0203 -0.0162 -0.0238 -0.0352
(0.68) (-0.42) (-0.70) (-1.19)
Socialist law -0.00674 -0.0452 -0.0473 -0.0745
(-0.09) (-0.62) (-0.66) (-1.12)
German civil law 0.00329 -0.0673 -0.0383 -0.0474
(0.09) (-1.39) (-0.76) (-1.07)
Scandinavian law 0.114* 0.0737 0.0915 0.100*
(1.88) (1.30) (1.47) (1.76)
Colonial origin: British -0.0954** -0.100*** -0.115***
(-2.42) (-2.78) (-3.44)
Colonial origin: French -0.0383 -0.0471 -0.0515
(-0.63) (-0.91) (-1.04)
Colonial origin: Portuguese -0.0493 -0.0464 -0.0344
(-1.55) (-1.55) (-1.13)
Colonial origin: Other European -0.0783 -0.0466 -0.0594
(-1.04) (-0.78) (-0.97)
Log GDP per capita -0.0312* -0.0356**
(-1.89) (-2.28)
Usage of Plough Agriculture 0.0661
(1.48)
Constant 1.217*** 1.047*** 1.146*** 1.007*** 1.077*** 1.324*** 1.294***
(14.42) (7.09) (12.03) (7.06) (7.74) (7.04) (7.22)
Adjusted R2 0.743 0.764 0.794 0.795 0.818 0.832 0.844
Observations 55 55 53 53 53 53 53
Continetal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Relig Fractionalization No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legal Origins No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
ColonialOrigins No No No No Yes Yes Yes
GDP/capita No No No No No Yes Yes
PloughAgriculture No No No No No No Yes
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Land Gini is a ratio measuring the Inequality in Land ownership taking into
account Landlessness, and the variable is from Vollrath and Erickson (2007). Originally taken from FAO database (Food and Agricultural Organization of
the United Nations), and measures Land Holdings by size in acres. Y022 is the Gender Equality Index, a combined scale from the World Values Survey,
consisting of the following three variables: JSC (C001) ”When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” (agreement coded
low - higher values indicate equality). WPL (D059) ”On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do” (agreement coded low - higher
values indicate equality). UIG (D060) ”A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate
equality). Fractionalization measures the amount of ethnic, religious and linguistic homogeneity in a country, and is taken from Alesina (2001). Legal
origins is an indicator, taking different values with respect to the legal tradition that influenced a given country (e.g. British, French, Socialist etc.) and is
taken from Nunn (2012). Colonial origins is an indicator, taking different values with respect to the country that may had colonized a given country (e.g.
Spanish, British etc.) and is taken from Acemoglu (2001). GDP is measured in log GDP per capita, ppp (constant 2011 international U.S. Dollars) and is
taken from Quality of Governence Database (2018). Plough measures the degree of historical Plough usage, and is taken from Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn
(2013).
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Table A11: OLS Estimates of Land Inequality on Beliefs about Gender Equality - More Controls - All variables - C001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Continental Geographical Fractional Legal Colonial GDP All Controls
JSC (C001)
Vollrath Gini -0.682*** -0.606*** -0.597*** -0.378* -0.459** -0.417* -0.310
(-4.72) (-3.08) (-3.26) (-1.82) (-2.13) (-1.99) (-1.69)
Africa dummy -0.330*** -0.154 -0.265*** -0.296*** -0.224* -0.220** -0.247***
(-3.34) (-1.02) (-2.87) (-2.80) (-1.74) (-2.05) (-2.76)
Europe dummy -0.127*** 0.0740 -0.0419 -0.0847 -0.0920 -0.00886 -0.0464
(-3.84) (0.65) (-0.50) (-0.89) (-0.83) (-0.09) (-0.50)
Asia dummy -0.458*** -0.353*** -0.440*** -0.471*** -0.384** -0.305** -0.337**
(-16.93) (-5.23) (-3.55) (-3.28) (-2.50) (-2.14) (-2.70)
Oceania dummy 0 0 -0.174 -0.240 -0.133 0.0385 0.0755
(.) (.) (-1.15) (-1.27) (-0.68) (0.19) (0.43)
Americas dummy -0.0911*** 0.166 0 0 0 0 0
(-3.44) (1.07) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Dummy for Landlocked -0.0595 -0.0988 -0.0701 -0.0627 -0.106 -0.0786
(-1.22) (-1.62) (-1.15) (-1.03) (-1.68) (-1.15)
Latitude -0.000419 -0.000742 -0.000481 -0.000454 -0.000290 -0.000653
(-0.36) (-0.71) (-0.44) (-0.39) (-0.26) (-0.44)
Longitude 0.00103 0.000643 0.000951 0.000639 0.0000293 -0.00000249
(1.35) (0.90) (1.09) (0.68) (0.03) (-0.00)
Religious fragmentation 0.209*** 0.274*** 0.360*** 0.402*** 0.392***
(2.95) (2.86) (4.32) (4.79) (4.77)
French civil law 0.0206 -0.0447 -0.0575 -0.0738
(0.41) (-0.79) (-1.08) (-1.45)
Socialist law -0.0216 -0.0893 -0.0930 -0.132
(-0.23) (-0.97) (-1.06) (-1.54)
German civil law -0.0371 -0.159** -0.111 -0.124*
(-0.64) (-2.07) (-1.39) (-1.71)
Scandinavian law 0.191** 0.125 0.155* 0.167**
(2.14) (1.53) (1.70) (2.04)
Colonial origin: British -0.167*** -0.175*** -0.196***
(-2.80) (-3.11) (-3.64)
Colonial origin: French -0.0684 -0.0831 -0.0893
(-0.73) (-1.12) (-1.21)
Colonial origin: Portuguese -0.0912 -0.0863 -0.0692
(-1.53) (-1.52) (-1.14)
Colonial origin: Other European -0.116 -0.0629 -0.0812
(-1.04) (-0.73) (-0.89)
Log GDP per capita -0.0522 -0.0584*
(-1.61) (-1.88)
Usage of Plough Agriculture 0.0943
(1.22)
Constant 1.377*** 1.138*** 1.184*** 0.966*** 1.076*** 1.490*** 1.447***
(10.92) (4.79) (7.94) (4.78) (5.65) (4.84) (4.66)
Adjusted R2 0.658 0.664 0.696 0.703 0.738 0.758 0.768
Observations 55 55 53 53 53 53 53
Continetal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Relig Fractionalization No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legal Origins No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
ColonialOrigins No No No No Yes Yes Yes
GDP/capita No No No No No Yes Yes
PloughAgriculture No No No No No No Yes
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Land Gini is a ratio measuring the Inequality in Land ownership taking into
account Landlessness, and the variable is from Vollrath and Erickson (2007). Originally taken from FAO database (Food and Agricultural Organization
of the United Nations), and measures Land Holdings by size in acres. JSC (C001) ”When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job
than women” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). Fractionalization measures the amount of ethnic, religious and linguistic
homogeneity in a country, and is taken from Alesina (2001). Legal origins is an indicator, taking different values with respect to the legal tradition
that influenced a given country (e.g. British, French, Socialist etc.) and is taken from Nunn (2012). Colonial origins is an indicator, taking different
values with respect to the country that may had colonized a given country (e.g. Spanish, British etc.) and is taken from Acemoglu (2001). GDP is
measured in log GDP per capita, ppp (constant 2011 international U.S. Dollars) and is taken from Quality of Governence Database (2018). Plough
measures the degree of historical Plough usage, and is taken from Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013).
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Table A12: OLS Estimates of Land Inequality on Beliefs about Gender Equality - More Controls - All variables - D059
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Continental Geographical Fractional Legal Colonial GDP All Controls
WPL (D059)
Vollrath Gini -0.594*** -0.567*** -0.596*** -0.420** -0.484*** -0.450** -0.392**
(-5.47) (-4.52) (-4.80) (-2.33) (-2.83) (-2.62) (-2.25)
Africa dummy -0.260*** -0.0594 -0.288*** -0.287*** -0.250*** -0.246*** -0.261***
(-3.97) (-0.61) (-4.83) (-4.25) (-3.11) (-3.68) (-4.09)
Europe dummy -0.0453* 0.197** -0.0271 -0.0261 -0.0399 0.0270 0.00641
(-1.69) (2.61) (-0.47) (-0.41) (-0.58) (0.41) (0.09)
Asia dummy -0.284*** -0.147*** -0.344*** -0.344*** -0.301*** -0.237** -0.255***
(-12.61) (-3.31) (-3.81) (-3.30) (-3.07) (-2.69) (-2.97)
Oceania dummy 0 0 -0.243** -0.243* -0.193 -0.0549 -0.0347
(.) (.) (-2.14) (-1.78) (-1.50) (-0.49) (-0.34)
Americas dummy -0.0152 0.274** 0 0 0 0 0
(-1.11) (2.53) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Dummy for Landlocked -0.0507 -0.0646 -0.0550 -0.0502 -0.0846* -0.0699
(-1.40) (-1.67) (-1.27) (-1.23) (-1.95) (-1.63)
Latitude -0.000929 -0.00133** -0.00123* -0.00122* -0.00109 -0.00129*
(-1.34) (-2.39) (-1.94) (-1.87) (-1.65) (-2.02)
Longitude 0.00107** 0.000703 0.000731 0.000622 0.000131 0.000113
(2.09) (1.41) (1.23) (1.08) (0.26) (0.25)
Religious fragmentation 0.0994** 0.111* 0.171*** 0.205*** 0.200***
(2.15) (1.69) (2.96) (3.91) (4.10)
French civil law 0.00217 -0.0446 -0.0549* -0.0638**
(0.07) (-1.20) (-1.70) (-2.06)
Socialist law -0.0447 -0.102 -0.104 -0.126*
(-0.57) (-1.35) (-1.41) (-1.71)
German civil law 0.0373 -0.0560 -0.0169 -0.0240
(1.05) (-1.15) (-0.37) (-0.55)
Scandinavian law 0.0792 0.0257 0.0496 0.0564
(1.21) (0.46) (0.83) (0.96)
Colonial origin: British -0.122*** -0.128*** -0.140***
(-3.02) (-3.64) (-3.92)
Colonial origin: French -0.0308 -0.0427 -0.0461
(-0.50) (-0.91) (-1.01)
Colonial origin: Portuguese -0.0887*** -0.0848*** -0.0754***
(-2.99) (-3.16) (-3.04)
Colonial origin: Other European -0.113* -0.0706* -0.0806*
(-1.80) (-1.75) (-1.97)
Log GDP per capita -0.0420*** -0.0454***
(-2.98) (-3.38)
Usage of Plough Agriculture 0.0516
(1.48)
Constant 1.164*** 0.945*** 1.176*** 1.012*** 1.108*** 1.440*** 1.417***
(12.26) (6.29) (10.48) (5.65) (7.27) (7.87) (8.15)
Adjusted R2 0.721 0.769 0.781 0.777 0.833 0.862 0.868
Observations 55 55 53 53 53 53 53
Continetal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Relig Fractionalization No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legal Origins No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
ColonialOrigins No No No No Yes Yes Yes
GDP/capita No No No No No Yes Yes
PloughAgriculture No No No No No No Yes
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Land Gini is a ratio measuring the Inequality in Land ownership taking into
account Landlessness, and the variable is from Vollrath and Erickson (2007). Originally taken from FAO database (Food and Agricultural Organization
of the United Nations), and measures Land Holdings by size in acres. WPL (D059) ”On the whole, men make better political leaders than women
do” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). Fractionalization measures the amount of ethnic, religious and linguistic homogeneity in a
country, and is taken from Alesina (2001). Legal origins is an indicator, taking different values with respect to the legal tradition that influenced a given
country (e.g. British, French, Socialist etc.) and is taken from Nunn (2012). Colonial origins is an indicator, taking different values with respect to the
country that may had colonized a given country (e.g. Spanish, British etc.) and is taken from Acemoglu (2001). GDP is measured in log GDP per capita,
ppp (constant 2011 international U.S. Dollars) and is taken from Quality of Governence Database (2018). Plough measures the degree of historical Plough
usage, and is taken from Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013).
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Table A13: OLS Estimates of Land Inequality on Beliefs about Gender Equality - More Controls - All variables - D060
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Continental Geographical Fractional Legal Colonial GDP All Controls
UIG (D060)
Vollrath Gini -0.486*** -0.484*** -0.482*** -0.447*** -0.440** -0.438** -0.375**
(-4.59) (-3.66) (-3.47) (-2.80) (-2.46) (-2.43) (-2.11)
Africa dummy -0.114** -0.0551 -0.0826 -0.0964 -0.102 -0.101 -0.117
(-2.58) (-0.91) (-1.46) (-1.48) (-1.26) (-1.25) (-1.55)
Europe dummy -0.0334 0.0414 0.0125 -0.00847 -0.0146 -0.00955 -0.0316
(-1.29) (0.68) (0.24) (-0.14) (-0.22) (-0.14) (-0.49)
Asia dummy -0.197*** -0.153*** -0.172** -0.186* -0.197* -0.192 -0.211*
(-9.97) (-4.35) (-2.02) (-1.94) (-1.70) (-1.66) (-2.01)
Oceania dummy 0 0 -0.0526 -0.0677 -0.0839 -0.0735 -0.0518
(.) (.) (-0.50) (-0.54) (-0.55) (-0.49) (-0.36)
Americas dummy -0.0172 0.0563 0 0 0 0 0
(-1.10) (0.61) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Dummy for Landlocked -0.0267 -0.0496 -0.0391 -0.0396 -0.0422 -0.0264
(-0.81) (-1.11) (-0.67) (-0.65) (-0.68) (-0.43)
Latitude -0.000430 -0.000597 -0.000458 -0.000444 -0.000434 -0.000647
(-0.83) (-1.13) (-0.79) (-0.74) (-0.72) (-0.88)
Longitude 0.000232 0.0000544 0.000212 0.000276 0.000239 0.000221
(0.52) (0.11) (0.37) (0.42) (0.36) (0.37)
Religious fragmentation 0.0800** 0.119** 0.119** 0.121** 0.115**
(2.19) (2.61) (2.29) (2.27) (2.35)
French civil law 0.0401 0.0470 0.0462 0.0367
(1.67) (1.39) (1.39) (1.30)
Socialist law 0.0190 0.0249 0.0247 0.00192
(0.28) (0.30) (0.30) (0.03)
German civil law 0.00489 0.00993 0.0129 0.00529
(0.15) (0.22) (0.26) (0.12)
Scandinavian law 0.0724 0.0782 0.0800 0.0872
(1.49) (1.42) (1.38) (1.61)
Colonial origin: British 0.00749 0.00702 -0.00519
(0.20) (0.19) (-0.15)
Colonial origin: French -0.00450 -0.00538 -0.00905
(-0.07) (-0.09) (-0.15)
Colonial origin: Portuguese -0.0276 -0.0273 -0.0173
(-0.93) (-0.91) (-0.55)
Colonial origin: Other European -0.00773 -0.00453 -0.0153
(-0.13) (-0.08) (-0.25)
Log GDP per capita -0.00315 -0.00681
(-0.21) (-0.46)
Usage of Plough Agriculture 0.0554
(1.26)
Constant 1.177*** 1.125*** 1.132*** 1.065*** 1.059*** 1.084*** 1.059***
(12.65) (7.67) (10.27) (8.15) (7.31) (5.42) (5.46)
Adjusted R2 0.664 0.659 0.672 0.668 0.632 0.622 0.632
Observations 55 55 53 53 53 53 53
Continetal Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Relig Fractionalization No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legal Origins No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
ColonialOrigins No No No No Yes Yes Yes
GDP/capita No No No No No Yes Yes
PloughAgriculture No No No No No No Yes
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Land Gini is a ratio measuring the Inequality in Land ownership taking into
account Landlessness, and the variable is from Vollrath and Erickson (2007). Originally taken from FAO database (Food and Agricultural Organization
of the United Nations), and measures Land Holdings by size in acres. UIG (D060) ”A university education is more important for a boy than for a
girl” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). Fractionalization measures the amount of ethnic, religious and linguistic homogeneity
in a country, and is taken from Alesina (2001). Legal origins is an indicator, taking different values with respect to the legal tradition that influenced
a given country (e.g. British, French, Socialist etc.) and is taken from Nunn (2012). Colonial origins is an indicator, taking different values with
respect to the country that may had colonized a given country (e.g. Spanish, British etc.) and is taken from Acemoglu (2001). GDP is measured in
log GDP per capita, ppp (constant 2011 international U.S. Dollars) and is taken from Quality of Governence Database (2018). Plough measures the
degree of historical Plough usage, and is taken from Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013).
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Table A14: OLS Estimates of Land Inequality on Beliefs about Gender Equality - WVS (Micro Sample) - All variables - Y022
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continental Geographical GDP All Controls
Equality (Y022)
Vollrath Gini -0.358*** -0.385** -0.396*** -0.324**
(-3.12) (-2.61) (-2.68) (-2.06)
Sex 0.0863*** 0.0852*** 0.0855*** 0.0856***
(11.89) (12.02) (12.07) (12.09)
Age 0.00198*** 0.00176*** 0.00178*** 0.00173***
(3.05) (2.89) (3.08) (3.08)
Age squared -0.0000278*** -0.0000266*** -0.0000264*** -0.0000267***
(-3.94) (-4.13) (-4.04) (-4.16)
Educational level 0.0154*** 0.0154*** 0.0156*** 0.0159***
(8.31) (8.77) (10.94) (12.56)
Employment status -0.0000710 -0.0000208 -0.000115 -0.000143
(-0.04) (-0.02) (-0.09) (-0.11)
Scale of incomes 0.00462*** 0.00440*** 0.00447*** 0.00410***
(3.12) (2.91) (2.86) (2.78)
Africa dummy 0 -0.219*** -0.221*** -0.264***
(.) (-3.60) (-3.50) (-4.14)
Europe dummy 0.156*** -0.0239 -0.0206 -0.0582
(2.70) (-0.34) (-0.30) (-0.81)
Asia dummy -0.131** -0.365*** -0.366*** -0.420***
(-2.44) (-3.51) (-3.47) (-3.81)
Oceania dummy 0.179*** -0.127 -0.117 -0.130
(3.52) (-1.14) (-1.09) (-1.22)
Americas dummy 0.150*** 0 0 0
(3.03) (.) (.) (.)
Dummy for Landlocked -0.0486* -0.0544 -0.0474
(-1.69) (-1.57) (-1.50)
Latitude -0.000542 -0.000492 -0.000741
(-0.67) (-0.59) (-0.92)
Longitude 0.000576 0.000561 0.000683
(1.03) (1.01) (1.23)
Log GDP per capita -0.00736 -0.0121
(-0.39) (-0.67)
Usage of Plough Agriculture 0.0684**
(2.52)
Constant 0.617*** 0.854*** 0.931*** 0.908***
(4.55) (7.09) (3.79) (3.85)
Adjusted R2 0.299 0.307 0.307 0.310
Observations 119309 119309 119309 119309
Individual Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continetal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical No Yes Yes Yes
GDP/capita No No Yes Yes
PloughAgriculture No No No Yes
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Land Gini is a ratio measuring the Inequality in Land ownership taking
into account Landlessness, and the variable is from Vollrath and Erickson (2007). Originally taken from FAO database (Food and Agricultural
Organization of the United Nations), and measures Land Holdings by size in acres. Y022 is the Gender Equality Index, a combined scale from
the World Values Survey (Longitudinal data from 1999 to 2014), consisting of the following three variables: JSC (C001) ”When jobs are scarce,
men should have more right to a job than women” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). WPL (D059) ”On the whole, men
make better political leaders than women do” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). UIG (D060) ”A university education is
more important for a boy than for a girl” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). GDP is measured in log GDP per capita, ppp
(constant 2011 international U.S. Dollars) and is taken from Quality of Governence Database (2018). Plough measures the degree of historical
Plough usage, and is taken from Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013). All specifications include Individual controls, such as age, age squared,
gender, highest education, employment status, income, and are weighted using the original weights provided from the WVS database.
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Table A15: OLS Estimates of Land Inequality on Beliefs about Gender Equality - WVS (Micro Sample) - All variables - C001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continental Geographical GDP All Controls
JSC (C001)
Vollrath Gini -1.203 -1.611 -1.495 -1.045
(-1.40) (-1.31) (-1.34) (-1.33)
Sex 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.0983*** 0.0988***
(7.57) (7.80) (7.58) (7.55)
Age -0.000438 0.000212 -0.0000745 -0.000391
(-0.15) (0.10) (-0.03) (-0.17)
Age squared 0.00000370 -0.00000122 -0.00000278 -0.00000418
(0.09) (-0.04) (-0.08) (-0.13)
Educational level -0.00187 -0.00106 -0.00401 -0.00233
(-0.09) (-0.05) (-0.17) (-0.11)
Employment status 0.00122 0.00232 0.00339 0.00322
(0.19) (0.36) (0.50) (0.47)
Scale of incomes 0.0428 0.0430 0.0422 0.0398
(1.35) (1.35) (1.36) (1.37)
Africa dummy 0 0.286 0.312 0.0448
(.) (0.51) (0.54) (0.12)
Europe dummy 0.109 0.472 0.434 0.197
(0.79) (0.92) (0.91) (0.63)
Asia dummy -0.229** 0.234 0.246 -0.0946
(-2.53) (0.31) (0.33) (-0.18)
Oceania dummy 0.251** 0.713 0.601 0.521
(2.64) (0.85) (0.82) (0.79)
Americas dummy -0.142 0 0 0
(-0.41) (.) (.) (.)
Dummy for Landlocked -0.0246 0.0409 0.0853
(-0.19) (0.23) (0.46)
Latitude -0.00238 -0.00295 -0.00451
(-0.75) (-0.83) (-1.06)
Longitude -0.00187 -0.00170 -0.000933
(-0.67) (-0.65) (-0.44)
Log GDP per capita 0.0831 0.0530
(0.88) (0.72)
Usage of Plough Agriculture 0.431
(1.29)
Constant 1.236* 1.308** 0.438 0.299
(1.68) (2.28) (0.62) (0.40)
Adjusted R2 0.077 0.079 0.082 0.096
Observations 119309 119309 119309 119309
Individual Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continetal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical No Yes Yes Yes
GDP/capita No No Yes Yes
PloughAgriculture No No No Yes
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Land Gini is a ratio measuring the Inequality in Land ownership taking
into account Landlessness, and the variable is from Vollrath and Erickson (2007). Originally taken from FAO database (Food and Agricultural
Organization of the United Nations), and measures Land Holdings by size in acres. Data about beliefs are taken from World Values Survey
(Longitudinal data from 1999 to 2014). JSC (C001) ”When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” (agreement
coded low - higher values indicate equality). GDP is measured in log GDP per capita, ppp (constant 2011 international U.S. Dollars) and is taken
from Quality of Governence Database (2018). Plough measures the degree of historical Plough usage, and is taken from Alesina, Giuliano and
Nunn (2013). All specifications include Individual controls, such as age, age squared, gender, highest education, employment status, income, and
are weighted using the original weights provided from the WVS database.
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Table A16: OLS Estimates of Land Inequality on Beliefs about Gender Equality - WVS (Micro Sample) - All variables - D059
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continental Geographical GDP All Controls
WPL (D059)
Vollrath Gini -0.874 -1.145* -1.289** -1.208*
(-1.66) (-1.83) (-2.06) (-1.78)
Sex 0.249*** 0.245*** 0.250*** 0.250***
(11.06) (10.95) (11.74) (11.76)
Age 0.00744*** 0.00695*** 0.00731*** 0.00725***
(3.17) (3.12) (3.44) (3.44)
Age squared -0.0000939*** -0.0000919*** -0.0000900*** -0.0000902***
(-3.86) (-4.12) (-3.88) (-3.89)
Educational level 0.0362*** 0.0362*** 0.0398*** 0.0401***
(5.88) (5.98) (8.49) (8.76)
Employment status 0.00413 0.00484 0.00352 0.00349
(0.82) (1.13) (0.84) (0.83)
Scale of incomes 0.0145*** 0.0138*** 0.0148*** 0.0144***
(3.08) (2.93) (3.04) (2.96)
Africa dummy 0 -0.732*** -0.764*** -0.812***
(.) (-3.48) (-3.64) (-3.92)
Europe dummy 0.553*** -0.0107 0.0360 -0.00645
(2.98) (-0.04) (0.13) (-0.02)
Asia dummy -0.267 -0.980** -0.995** -1.056***
(-1.61) (-2.54) (-2.64) (-2.75)
Oceania dummy 0.483** -0.487 -0.349 -0.364
(2.57) (-1.07) (-0.76) (-0.80)
Americas dummy 0.534*** 0 0 0
(3.70) (.) (.) (.)
Dummy for Landlocked -0.132 -0.213 -0.205
(-1.25) (-1.48) (-1.44)
Latitude -0.00292 -0.00222 -0.00250
(-0.98) (-0.79) (-0.92)
Longitude 0.00134 0.00113 0.00126
(0.61) (0.53) (0.59)
Log GDP per capita -0.102* -0.108*
(-1.79) (-1.88)
Usage of Plough Agriculture 0.0771
(0.91)
Constant 2.305*** 3.246*** 4.316*** 4.291***
(4.21) (5.75) (4.98) (4.88)
Adjusted R2 0.139 0.144 0.146 0.146
Observations 119309 119309 119309 119309
Individual Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continetal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical No Yes Yes Yes
GDP/capita No No Yes Yes
PloughAgriculture No No No Yes
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Land Gini is a ratio measuring the Inequality in Land ownership taking
into account Landlessness, and the variable is from Vollrath and Erickson (2007). Originally taken from FAO database (Food and Agricultural
Organization of the United Nations), and measures Land Holdings by size in acres. Data about beliefs are taken from World Values Survey
(Longitudinal data from 1999 to 2014). WPL (D059) ”On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do” (agreement coded low
- higher values indicate equality). GDP is measured in log GDP per capita, ppp (constant 2011 international U.S. Dollars) and is taken from
Quality of Governence Database (2018). Plough measures the degree of historical Plough usage, and is taken from Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn
(2013). All specifications include Individual controls, such as age, age squared, gender, highest education, employment status, income, and are
weighted using the original weights provided from the WVS database.
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Table A17: OLS Estimates of Land Inequality on Beliefs about Gender Equality - WVS (Micro Sample) - All variables - D060
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continental Geographical GDP All Controls
UIG (D060)
Vollrath Gini -0.777** -1.099*** -1.098** -0.894**
(-2.57) (-2.70) (-2.68) (-2.19)
Sex 0.229*** 0.228*** 0.228*** 0.229***
(10.83) (10.87) (10.82) (10.86)
Age 0.00771*** 0.00818*** 0.00818*** 0.00803***
(4.31) (4.10) (4.09) (4.14)
Age squared -0.000102*** -0.000106*** -0.000106*** -0.000106***
(-4.50) (-4.49) (-4.50) (-4.62)
Educational level 0.0462*** 0.0470*** 0.0469*** 0.0477***
(7.71) (7.76) (8.98) (9.13)
Employment status -0.00120 -0.000410 -0.000405 -0.000483
(-0.33) (-0.11) (-0.12) (-0.14)
Scale of incomes 0.0101 0.0101 0.0101 0.00905
(1.60) (1.66) (1.63) (1.46)
Africa dummy 0 -0.0792 -0.0791 -0.201
(.) (-0.46) (-0.45) (-1.01)
Europe dummy 0.269*** 0.258 0.257 0.149
(2.86) (1.23) (1.24) (0.67)
Asia dummy -0.288*** -0.229 -0.229 -0.384
(-2.99) (-0.72) (-0.72) (-1.13)
Oceania dummy 0.305*** 0.355 0.355 0.318
(2.89) (0.96) (0.96) (0.86)
Americas dummy 0.195** 0 0 0
(2.39) (.) (.) (.)
Dummy for Landlocked -0.0913 -0.0910 -0.0707
(-1.00) (-0.91) (-0.81)
Latitude -0.00198 -0.00198 -0.00270
(-1.08) (-1.05) (-1.47)
Longitude -0.00146 -0.00146 -0.00111
(-0.82) (-0.82) (-0.62)
Log GDP per capita 0.000417 -0.0133
(0.01) (-0.24)
Usage of Plough Agriculture 0.197
(1.62)
Constant 2.923*** 3.291*** 3.286*** 3.223***
(8.83) (9.13) (4.77) (5.25)
Adjusted R2 0.098 0.099 0.099 0.101
Observations 119309 119309 119309 119309
Individual Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continetal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical No Yes Yes Yes
GDP/capita No No Yes Yes
PloughAgriculture No No No Yes
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Land Gini is a ratio measuring the Inequality in Land ownership taking
into account Landlessness, and the variable is from Vollrath and Erickson (2007). Originally taken from FAO database (Food and Agricultural
Organization of the United Nations), and measures Land Holdings by size in acres. Data about beliefs are taken from World Values Survey
(Longitudinal data from 1999 to 2014). UIG (D060) ”A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl” (agreement coded
low - higher values indicate equality). GDP is measured in log GDP per capita, ppp (constant 2011 international U.S. Dollars) and is taken
from Quality of Governence Database (2018). Plough measures the degree of historical Plough usage, and is taken from Alesina, Giuliano and
Nunn (2013). All specifications include Individual controls, such as age, age squared, gender, highest education, employment status, income,
and are weighted using the original weights provided from the WVS database.
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Table A18: OLS Estimates of Land Inequality on Beliefs about Gender Equality - WVS (Micro Sample) - All waves
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Continental Geographical GDP All Controls
Equality (Y022)
Vollrath Gini -0.397*** -0.445*** -0.447*** -0.387**
(-3.97) (-3.25) (-3.25) (-2.64)
Adjusted R2 0.274 0.280 0.280 0.283
JSC (C001)
Vollrath Gini -1.009 -1.376 -1.261 -0.897
(-1.66) (-1.52) (-1.57) (-1.59)
Adjusted R2 0.077 0.079 0.082 0.092
WPL (D059)
Vollrath Gini -1.045** -1.256** -1.400** -1.370**
(-2.32) (-2.20) (-2.42) (-2.19)
Adjusted R2 0.123 0.127 0.129 0.129
UIG (D060)
Vollrath Gini -0.841*** -1.268*** -1.243*** -1.094***
(-3.07) (-3.45) (-3.33) (-2.82)
Adjusted R2 0.088 0.091 0.091 0.092
Observations 150060 150060 150060 150060
Individual Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continetal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical No Yes Yes Yes
GDP/capita No No Yes Yes
PloughAgriculture No No No Yes
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Land Gini is a ratio measuring the Inequality in Land ownership
taking into account Landlessness, and the variable is from Vollrath and Erickson (2007). Originally taken from FAO database (Food
and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations), and measures Land Holdings by size in acres. Y022 is the Gender Equality
Index, a combined scale from the World Values Survey (Longitudinal data from 1981 to 2014), consisting of the following three variables:
JSC (C001) ”When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate
equality). WPL (D059) ”On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do” (agreement coded low - higher values
indicate equality). UIG (D060) ”A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl” (agreement coded low - higher
values indicate equality). GDP is measured in log GDP per capita, ppp (constant 2011 international U.S. Dollars) and is taken from
Quality of Governence Database (2018). Plough measures the degree of historical Plough usage, and is taken from Alesina, Giuliano
and Nunn (2013). All specifications include Individual controls, such as age, age squared, gender, highest education, employment status,
income, and are weighted using the original weights provided from the WVS database.
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Figure A1: Distribution of Beliefs towards Gender Equality (Y022)
Notes: Gender Equality Index is a combined scale from the World Values Survey, consisting of the following
three variables: C001 “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” (agreement
coded low - higher values indicate equality); D059 “On the whole, men make better political leaders than
women do” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality); D060 “A university education is more
important for a boy than for a girl” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). The correlation
of the three variables (C001, D059 and D060) is higher than 0.8.
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Table A19: Second Generation Immigrant Samples - Country of Birth and Parental Origin
Country Number Pct % Country Number Pct % Country Number Pct %
of Birth of Origin, of Origin,
Mother Father
Austria 126 6.1 Argentina 11 0.8 Argentina 8 0.6
Belgium 131 6.3 Australia 4 0.3 Australia 4 0.3
Czech Republic 91 4.4 Austria 32 2.5 Austria 37 2.8
Estonia 8 0.4 Bangladesh 7 0.5 Bangladesh 7 0.5
Finland 15 0.7 Belgium 18 1.4 Belgium 14 1.1
France 179 8.6 Brazil 15 1.2 Belize 1 0.1
Germany 225 10.8 Canada 7 0.5 Brazil 5 0.4
Hungary 15 0.7 Colombia 1 0.1 Brunei 1 0.1
Iceland 20 1.0 Cote d’Ivoire 1 0.1 Canada 5 0.4
Ireland 113 5.4 Cyprus 1 0.1 Congo, DR 2 0.2
Israel 506 24.4 Czech Republic 31 2.4 Cote d’Ivoire 2 0.2
Italy 19 0.9 Denmark 18 1.4 Cyprus 1 0.1
Lithuania 8 0.4 Ecuador 3 0.2 Czech Republic 38 2.9
Netherlands 114 5.5 Ethiopia 13 1.0 Denmark 23 1.8
Norway 32 1.5 Finland 35 2.7 Dominican Rep. 1 0.1
Poland 27 1.3 France 69 5.3 Ethiopia 13 1.0
Portugal 26 1.3 Germany 151 11.6 Finland 19 1.4
Russia 2 0.1 Greece 5 0.4 France 50 3.8
Slovenia 12 0.6 Hungary 30 2.3 Germany 107 8.2
Spain 29 1.4 India 32 2.5 Greece 9 0.7
Sweden 104 5.0 Indonesia 19 1.5 Honduras 1 0.1
Switzerland 162 7.8 Iran 25 1.9 Hungary 37 2.8
United Kingdom 111 5.3 Iraq 64 4.9 India 30 2.3
Ireland 36 2.8 Indonesia 28 2.1
Israel 1 0.1 Iran 30 2.3
Italy 79 6.1 Iraq 69 5.3
Jamaica 6 0.5 Ireland 35 2.7
Japan 2 0.2 Israel 4 0.3
Lebanon 10 0.8 Italy 103 7.9
Libya 24 1.8 Jamaica 4 0.3
Luxembourg 2 0.2 Kenya 1 0.1
Madagascar 1 0.1 Lebanon 6 0.5
Mali 2 0.2 Libya 17 1.3
Mexico 1 0.1 Luxembourg 2 0.2
Netherlands 14 1.1 Madagascar 3 0.2
Norway 13 1.0 Mali 2 0.2
Pakistan 11 0.8 Mexico 1 0.1
Philippines 6 0.5 Netherlands 13 1.0
Poland 135 10.4 Norway 13 1.0
Portugal 20 1.5 Pakistan 13 1.0
Senegal 3 0.2 Philippines 2 0.2
South Africa 3 0.2 Poland 134 10.2
South Korea 1 0.1 Portugal 22 1.7
Spain 30 2.3 Senegal 3 0.2
Sri Lanka 5 0.4 South Africa 5 0.4
Suriname 6 0.5 South Korea 1 0.1
Sweden 10 0.8 Spain 38 2.9
Switzerland 8 0.6 Sri Lanka 4 0.3
Thailand 3 0.2 Suriname 7 0.5
Tunisia 41 3.2 Sweden 9 0.7
Turkey 96 7.4 Switzerland 6 0.5
United Kingdom 59 4.5 Togo 1 0.1
United States 32 2.5 Tunisia 42 3.2
Venezuela 1 0.1 Turkey 110 8.4
Vietnam 5 0.4 Uganda 1 0.1
Yemen 41 3.2 United Kingdom 75 5.7





Total 2075 100.0 Total 1299 100.0 Total 1312 100.0
Sample size 2,075 Sample size 1,299 Sample size 1,312
Source: ESS Wave 8 (2016)
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Table A20: OLS Estimates of Land Inequality on Gender Equality Belief: When Jobs Scarce, Right to Work (C001) - ESS Sample (2nd Generation Immigrants) - All variables - Either Parent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Baseline Personal Religion Education Income GDP All Controls
Either Parent Sample
p Vollrath Gini -1.071* -1.061* -0.913 -0.849 -0.830 -1.287 -1.307
(-1.73) (-1.71) (-1.50) (-1.54) (-1.40) (-1.63) (-1.65)
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Belgium 0.274* 0.271* 0.249* 0.219* 0.178* 0.157 0.155
(1.90) (1.91) (1.84) (1.75) (1.67) (1.44) (1.44)
Czech Republic -0.367* -0.376* -0.476** -0.418** -0.401** -0.403** -0.403**
(-1.72) (-1.77) (-2.43) (-2.32) (-2.47) (-2.48) (-2.48)
Estonia -0.908*** -0.931*** -0.922*** -1.036*** -1.156*** -1.223*** -1.226***
(-3.67) (-3.53) (-3.71) (-5.54) (-4.82) (-4.42) (-4.42)
Finland 0.398** 0.385** 0.392** 0.326** 0.270* 0.234 0.232
(2.29) (2.33) (2.40) (2.05) (1.82) (1.48) (1.47)
France 0.428** 0.425** 0.411** 0.393*** 0.348*** 0.330*** 0.329***
(2.52) (2.55) (2.49) (2.84) (3.06) (2.88) (2.89)
Germany 0.294* 0.281* 0.245* 0.199 0.155 0.152 0.151
(1.96) (1.92) (1.76) (1.55) (1.53) (1.52) (1.53)
Hungary -0.0393 -0.0464 -0.152 -0.122 -0.225 -0.234 -0.233
(-0.15) (-0.18) (-0.63) (-0.55) (-0.84) (-0.87) (-0.86)
Iceland 0.561*** 0.515** 0.510*** 0.472*** 0.443*** 0.437*** 0.456**
(2.76) (2.47) (2.65) (2.91) (2.78) (2.74) (2.33)
Ireland 0.235 0.226 0.260 0.215 0.179 0.169 0.168
(1.24) (1.19) (1.50) (1.26) (1.35) (1.29) (1.29)
Israel -0.0819 -0.102 -0.0562 -0.123 -0.171 -0.210 -0.209
(-0.40) (-0.50) (-0.32) (-0.80) (-1.29) (-1.48) (-1.46)
Italy -0.131 -0.0963 0.0167 0.0540 0.214 0.198 0.196
(-0.74) (-0.55) (0.10) (0.35) (1.44) (1.32) (1.32)
Lithuania -0.758*** -0.784*** -0.653*** -0.705*** -1.033*** -1.079*** -1.080***
(-4.61) (-4.82) (-4.27) (-5.30) (-9.03) (-8.83) (-8.88)
Netherlands 0.489*** 0.484*** 0.440** 0.430*** 0.399*** 0.392*** 0.389***
(2.91) (2.93) (2.61) (2.86) (3.33) (3.26) (3.25)
Norway 0.670*** 0.645*** 0.605*** 0.523*** 0.475*** 0.468*** 0.470***
(3.97) (3.91) (4.10) (4.12) (4.08) (4.05) (4.01)
Poland -0.482* -0.484 -0.273 -0.254 -0.248 -0.267 -0.267
(-1.67) (-1.66) (-1.02) (-1.04) (-0.91) (-0.97) (-0.97)
Portugal 0.591** 0.575** 0.556*** 0.421** 0.501*** 0.467*** 0.466***
(2.56) (2.57) (2.99) (2.40) (3.97) (3.65) (3.66)
Russia -0.471 -0.524 -0.451 -0.580 0.687*** 0.705*** 0.705***
(-0.45) (-0.51) (-0.46) (-0.59) (5.40) (5.40) (5.41)
Slovenia 0.0309 0.0219 0.0236 0.0678 0.109 0.0881 0.0867
(0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.26) (0.41) (0.34) (0.34)
Spain 0.310 0.328 0.219 0.290 0.257 0.247 0.247
(1.12) (1.24) (0.90) (1.37) (1.27) (1.23) (1.23)
Sweden 0.678*** 0.657*** 0.577*** 0.531*** 0.500*** 0.484*** 0.483***
(4.40) (4.30) (4.12) (4.24) (4.71) (4.57) (4.59)
Switzerland 0.256 0.233 0.222 0.163 0.139 0.134 0.133
(1.31) (1.19) (1.29) (1.07) (0.98) (0.97) (0.96)
United Kingdom 0.460*** 0.459*** 0.468*** 0.429*** 0.377*** 0.376*** 0.374***
(2.78) (2.84) (3.16) (3.20) (3.43) (3.44) (3.50)
Age of respondent, calculated 0.00374 -0.00549 -0.00650 -0.0176** -0.0159* -0.0166** -0.0166**
(0.48) (-0.55) (-0.70) (-2.01) (-1.97) (-2.12) (-2.12)
Age of respondent, squared -0.000100 0.00000747 0.0000160 0.000129 0.000105 0.000112 0.000112
(-1.22) (0.07) (0.16) (1.36) (1.17) (1.29) (1.29)
Gender 0.234*** 0.245*** 0.267*** 0.256*** 0.277*** 0.275*** 0.275***
(4.61) (4.69) (5.01) (4.86) (4.94) (4.90) (4.89)
Doing last 7 days: paid work 0.166*** 0.147*** 0.0647 0.0492 0.0492 0.0496
(3.25) (3.07) (1.39) (0.86) (0.86) (0.86)
How religious are you -0.0291** -0.0251** -0.0241* -0.0242* -0.0241*
(-2.44) (-2.16) (-1.89) (-1.89) (-1.89)
How often attend religious services 0.0889*** 0.0922*** 0.0898*** 0.0897*** 0.0897***
(3.63) (3.93) (3.38) (3.38) (3.38)
How often pray apart from at religious services 0.00268 -0.0000551 0.00223 0.00227 0.00225
(0.22) (-0.00) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15)
Highest level of education 0.00119*** 0.00120*** 0.00120*** 0.00120***
(11.86) (10.98) (10.99) (10.98)
Level of income -0.00214 -0.00180 -0.00197
(-0.09) (-0.08) (-0.08)
GDP (parental country) -0.213 -0.209
(-0.88) (-0.85)
Usage of Plough (parental country) 0.0763
(0.21)
Constant 4.540*** 4.591*** 4.093*** 3.869*** 3.853*** 6.459** 6.363**
(8.98) (9.16) (7.37) (7.51) (6.54) (2.14) (2.05)
Adjusted R2 0.097 0.101 0.137 0.172 0.175 0.175 0.175
Observations 2075 2075 2075 2075 1747 1747 1747
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income No No No No Yes Yes Yes
GDP/capita No No No No No Yes Yes
PloughAgriculture No No No No No No Yes
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Land Gini is a ratio measuring the Inequality in Land ownership taking into account Landlessness, and the variable is from Vollrath and Erickson
(2007). Originally taken from FAO database (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations), and measures Land Holdings by size in acres. The dependent variable is taken from the European Social Survey
(Wave 8), and matches the WVS question measuring Gender Equality: C001 ”When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). There are
three subsamples, depending on the respondents: p Vollrath Gini captures the average Land Gini of the two parents birth country, in case either of them is an immigrant. The other two variables (fs Vollrath Gini and
ms Vollrath Gini) capture the average Land Gini on the Birth Country of Father and Mother respectively (i.e. only Father’s/Mother’s effect). GDP is measured in log GDP per capita, ppp (constant 2011 international
U.S. Dollars) and is taken from Quality of Governence Database (2018). Plough measures the degree of historical Plough usage, and is taken from Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013). Religious controls include answers to
the following questions: ”How religious are you?” ”How often do you attend religious services apart from special occasions?” ”How often do you pray apart from at religious services?”. Other individual controls include
age, gender, highest education, employment status, income, and are weighted using the original weights provided from the ESS database.
70
Table A21: OLS Estimates of Land Inequality on Gender Equality Belief: When Jobs Scarce, Right to Work (C001) - ESS Sample (2nd Generation Immigrants) - All variables - Father Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Baseline Personal Religion Education Income GDP All Controls
Father’s Origin Sample
fs Vollrath Gini -0.952* -1.053** -0.912** -0.846** -0.765 0.281 0.207
(-1.82) (-2.05) (-2.15) (-2.15) (-1.40) (0.39) (0.28)
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Belgium 0.200 0.203 0.206 0.155 0.119 0.162 0.159
(0.73) (0.78) (0.81) (0.66) (0.64) (0.82) (0.80)
Czech Republic -0.602 -0.595 -0.724* -0.674* -0.703** -0.707** -0.705**
(-1.53) (-1.55) (-1.97) (-1.97) (-2.49) (-2.59) (-2.58)
Estonia -1.158* -1.124* -1.125 -1.205* -1.263* -1.209* -1.203
(-1.80) (-1.68) (-1.60) (-1.74) (-1.75) (-1.68) (-1.66)
Finland 0.450 0.438 0.497* 0.522** 0.440** 0.462*** 0.477***
(1.53) (1.57) (1.79) (2.21) (2.65) (2.70) (2.68)
France 0.246 0.246 0.255 0.253 0.175 0.213 0.210
(0.79) (0.84) (0.91) (1.04) (1.02) (1.15) (1.14)
Germany 0.110 0.0997 0.0994 0.0668 0.0177 0.0337 0.0361
(0.39) (0.37) (0.38) (0.28) (0.09) (0.16) (0.17)
Hungary -0.0916 -0.0724 -0.203 -0.114 -0.196 -0.217 -0.216
(-0.31) (-0.24) (-0.75) (-0.48) (-0.96) (-1.13) (-1.12)
Iceland 0.420 0.365 0.393 0.300 0.261 0.287 0.327
(1.29) (1.14) (1.30) (1.06) (1.02) (1.07) (1.08)
Ireland 0.0278 0.0241 0.0689 0.0540 -0.00260 0.0290 0.0269
(0.09) (0.08) (0.24) (0.20) (-0.01) (0.13) (0.12)
Israel -0.162 -0.173 -0.112 -0.180 -0.284 -0.193 -0.191
(-0.50) (-0.55) (-0.39) (-0.72) (-1.25) (-0.75) (-0.74)
Italy 0.0895 0.204 0.228 0.212 0.0873 0.119 0.120
(0.14) (0.33) (0.39) (0.42) (0.18) (0.24) (0.24)
Lithuania -0.679** -0.697** -0.539 -0.457 -0.272 -0.203 -0.204
(-2.12) (-2.42) (-1.64) (-1.64) (-1.27) (-0.84) (-0.84)
Netherlands 0.529* 0.525* 0.522* 0.471* 0.417* 0.445** 0.440**
(1.88) (1.99) (1.96) (1.92) (1.94) (2.03) (2.01)
Norway 0.612* 0.564* 0.539* 0.510* 0.465* 0.491** 0.512**
(1.89) (1.80) (1.88) (1.99) (1.97) (2.02) (2.03)
Poland -0.875** -0.838** -0.663* -0.583* -0.580 -0.586 -0.587
(-2.22) (-2.19) (-1.80) (-1.69) (-1.43) (-1.48) (-1.48)
Portugal 0.687** 0.634** 0.600** 0.487* 0.401* 0.472* 0.470*
(2.10) (2.03) (2.07) (1.77) (1.78) (1.90) (1.89)
Russia -2.067*** -1.911*** -1.938*** -1.892*** -1.988*** -1.927*** -1.924***
(-6.88) (-6.81) (-7.25) (-7.95) (-9.94) (-8.68) (-8.63)
Slovenia 0.343 0.378 0.414 0.360 0.261 0.243 0.245
(1.03) (1.17) (1.35) (1.34) (1.22) (1.22) (1.22)
Spain 0.247 0.297 0.174 0.281 0.222 0.256 0.254
(0.58) (0.76) (0.46) (0.87) (0.71) (0.81) (0.80)
Sweden 0.660** 0.623** 0.534* 0.478* 0.449** 0.492** 0.500**
(2.17) (2.10) (1.87) (1.86) (2.06) (2.21) (2.19)
Switzerland 0.305 0.291 0.272 0.227 0.272 0.292 0.289
(1.02) (1.01) (1.03) (0.97) (1.34) (1.41) (1.39)
United Kingdom 0.350 0.360 0.391 0.325 0.262 0.278 0.277
(1.15) (1.24) (1.41) (1.35) (1.22) (1.26) (1.26)
Age of respondent, calculated -0.00248 -0.0166* -0.0182** -0.0267*** -0.0239*** -0.0228*** -0.0228***
(-0.29) (-1.69) (-2.25) (-3.38) (-3.07) (-2.82) (-2.82)
Age of respondent, squared -0.0000281 0.000138 0.000146* 0.000226*** 0.000190** 0.000179** 0.000180**
(-0.36) (1.41) (1.77) (2.85) (2.44) (2.23) (2.24)
Gender 0.278*** 0.294*** 0.307*** 0.296*** 0.341*** 0.344*** 0.344***
(5.17) (5.45) (5.42) (5.54) (5.40) (5.56) (5.57)
Doing last 7 days: paid work 0.257*** 0.233*** 0.147** 0.125 0.131 0.133
(3.40) (3.27) (2.07) (1.50) (1.58) (1.61)
How religious are you -0.0293* -0.0234 -0.0192 -0.0177 -0.0179
(-1.82) (-1.54) (-1.17) (-1.07) (-1.08)
How often attend religious services 0.0880*** 0.0916*** 0.0852** 0.0856** 0.0853**
(2.78) (3.08) (2.59) (2.59) (2.58)
How often pray apart from at religious services 0.00209 0.00322 0.0122 0.0134 0.0131
(0.13) (0.20) (0.72) (0.78) (0.76)
Highest level of education 0.00118*** 0.00120*** 0.00117*** 0.00117***
(9.90) (8.75) (8.86) (8.90)
Level of income -0.00787 -0.01000 -0.00976
(-0.29) (-0.37) (-0.36)
GDP (parental country) 0.395 0.387
(1.50) (1.49)
Usage of Plough (parental country) 0.260
(0.47)
Constant 4.558*** 4.716*** 4.270*** 3.987*** 3.901*** -1.091 -1.209
(8.75) (9.33) (8.42) (8.36) (6.69) (-0.32) (-0.35)
Adjusted R2 0.100 0.108 0.144 0.176 0.183 0.183 0.183
Observations 1312 1312 1312 1312 1097 1097 1097
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income No No No No Yes Yes Yes
GDP/capita No No No No No Yes Yes
PloughAgriculture No No No No No No Yes
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Land Gini is a ratio measuring the Inequality in Land ownership taking into account Landlessness, and the variable is from Vollrath and Erickson
(2007). Originally taken from FAO database (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations), and measures Land Holdings by size in acres. The dependent variable is taken from the European Social Survey
(Wave 8), and matches the WVS question measuring Gender Equality: C001 ”When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). There are
three subsamples, depending on the respondents: p Vollrath Gini captures the average Land Gini of the two parents birth country, in case either of them is an immigrant. The other two variables (fs Vollrath Gini and
ms Vollrath Gini) capture the average Land Gini on the Birth Country of Father and Mother respectively (i.e. only Father’s/Mother’s effect). GDP is measured in log GDP per capita, ppp (constant 2011 international
U.S. Dollars) and is taken from Quality of Governence Database (2018). Plough measures the degree of historical Plough usage, and is taken from Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013). Religious controls include answers to
the following questions: ”How religious are you?” ”How often do you attend religious services apart from special occasions?” ”How often do you pray apart from at religious services?”. Other individual controls include
age, gender, highest education, employment status, income, and are weighted using the original weights provided from the ESS database.
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Table A22: OLS Estimates of Land Inequality on Gender Equality Belief: When Jobs Scarce, Right to Work (C001) - ESS Sample (2nd Generation Immigrants) - All variables - Mother
Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Baseline Personal Religion Education Income GDP All Controls
Mother’s Origin Sample
ms Vollrath Gini -2.377*** -2.340*** -2.122*** -1.972*** -2.365*** -2.365*** -2.420***
(-3.53) (-3.47) (-3.50) (-3.52) (-4.04) (-4.92) (-5.05)
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Belgium 0.258* 0.233* 0.229 0.202 0.0935 0.0935 0.0924
(1.87) (1.68) (1.66) (1.54) (0.78) (0.80) (0.79)
Czech Republic -0.366 -0.373 -0.495 -0.433 -0.378 -0.378 -0.380
(-1.02) (-1.05) (-1.59) (-1.38) (-0.96) (-0.96) (-0.97)
Estonia -0.998*** -1.028*** -1.018*** -1.113*** -1.311*** -1.311*** -1.321***
(-3.43) (-3.30) (-3.50) (-4.63) (-4.29) (-4.47) (-4.51)
Finland 0.288 0.240 0.178 -0.0364 -0.108 -0.108 -0.111
(1.39) (1.17) (0.93) (-0.20) (-0.68) (-0.72) (-0.74)
France 0.633*** 0.624*** 0.632*** 0.600*** 0.531*** 0.531*** 0.527***
(3.27) (3.30) (3.20) (3.32) (3.43) (3.58) (3.53)
Germany 0.390** 0.381** 0.370*** 0.296** 0.235 0.235 0.234
(2.50) (2.47) (2.78) (2.25) (1.58) (1.61) (1.60)
Hungary 0.218 0.177 0.0619 -0.0101 -0.00651 -0.00651 -0.00968
(1.17) (0.99) (0.29) (-0.06) (-0.05) (-0.05) (-0.07)
Iceland 0.533** 0.474** 0.466** 0.430** 0.357** 0.357** 0.428**
(2.38) (2.10) (2.26) (2.42) (2.13) (2.13) (2.30)
Ireland 0.237 0.220 0.281 0.211 0.0999 0.0999 0.102
(1.12) (1.04) (1.42) (1.10) (0.61) (0.62) (0.64)
Israel 0.0203 -0.0109 0.0541 -0.0186 -0.125 -0.125 -0.121
(0.09) (-0.05) (0.29) (-0.11) (-0.81) (-0.80) (-0.77)
Italy 0.0302 0.0757 0.230 0.247 0.482* 0.482 0.477
(0.11) (0.30) (0.82) (0.90) (1.69) (1.64) (1.62)
Lithuania -0.620*** -0.656*** -0.493*** -0.563*** -0.897*** -0.897*** -0.897***
(-3.27) (-3.51) (-2.87) (-3.53) (-6.69) (-6.63) (-6.64)
Netherlands 0.446** 0.445** 0.406* 0.398* 0.335* 0.335** 0.330*
(2.01) (2.04) (1.73) (1.85) (1.97) (2.01) (1.98)
Norway 0.576*** 0.547*** 0.512*** 0.373** 0.237 0.237 0.285
(2.98) (2.81) (2.92) (2.24) (1.38) (1.39) (1.61)
Poland -0.0496 -0.0608 0.195 0.182 0.0992 0.0992 0.0963
(-0.26) (-0.32) (1.09) (1.07) (0.68) (0.66) (0.64)
Portugal 0.694 0.702* 0.704*** 0.643*** 0.586*** 0.586*** 0.587***
(1.64) (1.83) (3.38) (3.66) (3.68) (3.71) (3.64)
Russia -0.301 -0.372 -0.298 -0.428 0.871*** 0.871*** 0.871***
(-0.28) (-0.35) (-0.29) (-0.42) (6.36) (6.37) (6.34)
Slovenia 0.0890 0.0753 0.0742 0.0981 0.115 0.115 0.108
(0.28) (0.25) (0.27) (0.36) (0.40) (0.40) (0.38)
Spain 0.399 0.427 0.280 0.332 0.295 0.295 0.290
(1.04) (1.19) (0.78) (1.00) (0.98) (0.97) (0.95)
Sweden 0.551*** 0.526*** 0.432** 0.402** 0.295* 0.295** 0.293*
(2.98) (2.91) (2.53) (2.46) (1.92) (2.03) (2.00)
Switzerland 0.301 0.264 0.249 0.179 0.0731 0.0731 0.0715
(1.27) (1.12) (1.19) (0.92) (0.37) (0.37) (0.36)
United Kingdom 0.536*** 0.524*** 0.559*** 0.518*** 0.391*** 0.391*** 0.386***
(2.90) (2.87) (3.24) (3.17) (2.89) (2.91) (2.87)
Age of respondent, calculated 0.0115 0.000553 -0.00220 -0.0132 -0.0104 -0.0104 -0.0107
(1.13) (0.04) (-0.19) (-1.17) (-0.97) (-0.96) (-1.00)
Age of respondent, squared -0.000157 -0.0000290 -0.0000137 0.0000986 0.0000669 0.0000669 0.0000691
(-1.36) (-0.21) (-0.11) (0.79) (0.55) (0.54) (0.57)
Gender 0.257*** 0.271*** 0.286*** 0.273*** 0.268*** 0.268*** 0.267***
(3.55) (3.58) (3.74) (3.64) (3.61) (3.62) (3.61)
Doing last 7 days: paid work 0.204*** 0.186*** 0.107** 0.121* 0.121* 0.121*
(3.62) (3.63) (2.04) (1.69) (1.70) (1.70)
How religious are you -0.0369** -0.0315** -0.0262 -0.0262 -0.0268
(-2.48) (-2.10) (-1.51) (-1.51) (-1.53)
How often attend religious services 0.103*** 0.105*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.100***
(3.68) (3.83) (3.00) (3.00) (2.96)
How often pray apart from at religious services 0.0105 0.00641 0.0139 0.0139 0.0140
(0.71) (0.41) (0.61) (0.61) (0.62)
Highest level of education 0.00103*** 0.00109*** 0.00109*** 0.00109***
(8.04) (6.76) (6.74) (6.76)
Level of income -0.0295 -0.0295 -0.0295
(-1.02) (-1.02) (-1.02)
GDP (parental country) 0.000145 0.00309
(0.00) (0.01)
Usage of Plough (parental country) 0.423
(1.03)
Constant 5.267*** 5.305*** 4.742*** 4.527*** 5.072*** 5.071** 4.687*
(9.43) (9.73) (7.87) (8.28) (7.59) (2.09) (1.86)
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.101 0.160 0.184 0.189 0.188 0.188
Observations 1299 1299 1299 1299 1082 1082 1082
CountryFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religion No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income No No No No Yes Yes Yes
GDP/capita No No No No No Yes Yes
PloughAgriculture No No No No No No Yes
Notes: T-values in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Land Gini is a ratio measuring the Inequality in Land ownership taking into account Landlessness, and the variable is from Vollrath and Erickson
(2007). Originally taken from FAO database (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations), and measures Land Holdings by size in acres. The dependent variable is taken from the European Social Survey
(Wave 8), and matches the WVS question measuring Gender Equality: C001 ”When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” (agreement coded low - higher values indicate equality). There are
three subsamples, depending on the respondents: p Vollrath Gini captures the average Land Gini of the two parents birth country, in case either of them is an immigrant. The other two variables (fs Vollrath Gini and
ms Vollrath Gini) capture the average Land Gini on the Birth Country of Father and Mother respectively (i.e. only Father’s/Mother’s effect). GDP is measured in log GDP per capita, ppp (constant 2011 international
U.S. Dollars) and is taken from Quality of Governence Database (2018). Plough measures the degree of historical Plough usage, and is taken from Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013). Religious controls include answers to
the following questions: ”How religious are you?” ”How often do you attend religious services apart from special occasions?” ”How often do you pray apart from at religious services?”. Other individual controls include
age, gender, highest education, employment status, income, and are weighted using the original weights provided from the ESS database.
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